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NEW ISSUES IN MINORITY REPRESENTATION
RESURRECTING THE WHITE PRIMARY
ELLEN D. KATZ†
INTRODUCTION
An unprecedented number of noncompetitive or “safe” electoral
districts operate in the United States today.1  Noncompetitive districts
elect officials with more extreme political views and foster more polar-
ized legislatures than do competitive districts.2  More fundamentally,
they inhibit meaningful political participation.  That is because par-
ticipating in an election that is decided before it begins is an empty
exercise.  Voting in a competitive election is not, even though a single
vote will virtually never decide the outcome.  What a competitive elec-
tion offers to each voter is the opportunity to be the coveted swing
voter, the one whose support candidates most seek, the one for whom
they modify policy proposals and offer the political spoils that gener-
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1
See, e.g., Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives:  What Went Wrong
in the Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 184 -90 (2003) (col-
lecting and analyzing statistical evidence of declining electoral competition); Lani
Guinier, Supreme Democracy:  Bush v. Gore Redux, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 23, 58 n.152
(2002) (attributing noncompetitive districts to gerrymandering by incumbents); Rich-
ard S. Dunham et al., Does Your Vote Matter?, BUS. WK., June 14, 2004, at 60, 62 (report-
ing that in House elections “only 35 seats at best out of 435 are even remotely in play
this year”).
2 See, e.g, Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV.
593, 627-28 (2002)  [hereinafter Issacharoff, Gerrymandering] (linking noncompetitive
districts with political polarization); Dunham et al., supra note 1, at 66 (reporting that
noncompetitive districts elect less centrist candidates “who prefer head banging to
compromise”).
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ate loyalty.  Simply put, a competitive election offers every voter the
potential to be this year’s “NASCAR Dad.”3
In safe electoral districts, candidates compete for votes, if at all,
only in the majority party’s primary.4  Such primaries accordingly
function as the only juncture for meaningful political participation in
these jurisdictions.  Current law nevertheless permits the exclusion of
a sizeable minority of the district’s electorate from participating at this
pivotal point.  The Supreme Court has recently reinvigorated a politi-
cal party’s associational right to exclude nonmembers from participat-
ing in the party’s primary.5  This right itself is not novel, as a genera-
tion’s worth of precedent celebrates the associational rights of
political parties to define racially inclusive membership qualifications.6
What is new is the Court’s insistence that this associational right
trumps the participatory interests of nonmembers even when the pri-
mary reliably determines the ultimate victor in the general election.7
This rule repudiates what this Article argues is the core holding of
the White Primary Cases, namely that the Constitution requires that all
voters have access to a jurisdiction’s sole juncture of meaningful elec-
toral decision making.  As discussed in Part I.A, scholars have long
3 See Elizabeth Drew, Bush:  The Dream Campaign, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, June 10,
2004, at 23, 24 (defining the demographic captured by the phrase “NASCAR Dad” and
discussing its importance in the presidential election).
4
See Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses:  The Case for Judicial
Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 661-62 (2002)
[hereinafter Persily, In Defense] (noting that competitive primaries operate in non-
competitive districts).
5
See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000) (striking down Cali-
fornia’s blanket primary).
6
See, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 229 (1986) (strik-
ing down state law that excluded independent voters from party primaries); Demo-
cratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 126 (1981)
(holding that national party need not accept delegates to national convention elected
in a state-mandated open primary); cf. Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 850 (D.
Conn. 1976) (upholding state statute prohibiting nonmembers from voting in a party
primary), aff’d mem., 429 U.S. 989 (1976).  For two views on how Jones relates to this
precedent, see Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy,
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 769 (2001) [hereinafter Persily, Functional Defense] (“[Jones] was
the natural consequence of a series of decisions . . . over the last half-century.”); Sam-
uel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes:  Political Parties, Associational Freedoms,
and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274, 286 (2001) [hereinafter Issacharoff,
Private Parties] (arguing that the blanket primary at issue in Jones “does not fit doctri-
nally within any of the categories of cases in which a claim of freedom of expressive
association had previously held sway under the First Amendment”).
7
See Jones, 530 U.S. at 584 (stating that exclusion from a party primary does not
constitute disenfranchisement where nonmembers may join the party); infra notes 175-
76 and accompanying text (discussing Jones).
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criticized the White Primary Cases, and in particular Smith v. Allwright8
and Terry v. Adams,9 for applying constitutional constraints to the pri-
vate actors who orchestrated white primaries.10  Smith and Terry have
broad ramifications, but they neither expand the state action doctrine
nor damage associational freedom to the extent these scholars allege.
Instead, Smith and Terry posit that access to a competitive election is an
essential component of the right to vote.11  They recognize that mean-
ingful political participation requires the opportunity to influence
electoral outcomes. The white primaries that Smith and Terry invali-
dated denied this opportunity not simply because they were racially
exclusive, but because they enforced their exclusivity in the context of
determinative primary elections.12
8
321 U.S. 649 (1944).
9
345 U.S. 461 (1953).
10
See infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text (discussing the state action ques-
tion in the White Primary Cases).
11
For a sampling of scholarship describing the importance of fostering electoral
competition, see Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC:  The
Beginning of the End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1729, 1764-70 (2001); Bruce
E. Cain, Garrett’s Temptation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1589, 1603 (1999); Elizabeth Garrett, Is the
Party Over?  Courts and the Political Process, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 98 [hereinafter Garret,
Is the Party Over?]; Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of “Informed Voter” Ballot No-
tations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1533, 1554 (1999); Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly:
Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans
from Political Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 342-44; Richard L. Hasen, The “Politi-
cal Market” Metaphor and Election Law:  A Comment on Issacharoff and Pildes, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 719, 724-28 (1998); Issacharoff, Gerrymandering, supra note 2, at 626-30; Samuel
Issacharoff, Oversight of Regulated Political Markets, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 98-100
(2000); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets:  Partisan Lockups of
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 646-48 (1998); Issacharoff, Private Parties,
supra note 6, at 276; Pamela S. Karlan, Politics by Other Means, 85 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1698-
99 (1999); Daryl J. Levinson, Market Failures and Failures of Markets, 85 VA. L. REV. 1745
(1999); Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics—And Be
Thankful for Small Favors, in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
283, 285-86 (David K. Ryden ed., 2d ed. 2002); Daniel R. Ortiz, Duopoly Versus Auton-
omy:  How the Two -Party System Harms the Major Parties, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 754
(2000); Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties:  The Constitutional Constraints on Primary
Ballot Access Laws, 89 GEO. L.J. 2181, 2190-91 (2001); Persily, Functional Defense, supra
note 6, at 793-805; Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties:
A Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 788-91 (2000).  This
scholarship generally focuses more on background electoral structures and organiza-
tion than on claims of individual rights or entitlements.  See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes,
supra, at 645 (describing this approach); Persily & Cain, supra, at 778-82 (same).  This
Article locates within a more traditional rights-centered approach a commitment to
electoral competition similar to the one recent scholarship advances.
12
Infra note 113 and accompanying text.
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After Smith and Terry, the Court recognized the right to vote to be
a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.13  Part
I.B argues that, as a doctrinal matter, this development should have
outlawed ideologically based exclusions from determinative party
primaries, just as Smith and Terry prohibited racially motivated ones.14
Insofar as the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to vote, and
access to a competitive election is an essential component of that
right, Republicans excluded from the Democratic primary in a district
that is safely Democratic are denied the right to vote for the office at
issue.  Such an exclusive primary is functionally equivalent to a gen-
eral election in which only registered Democrats may participate.  The
latter restriction undeniably denies Republican voters their right to
vote.  A Democratic primary that both excludes Republicans and dic-
tates the victor in the general election should be no different.
To be sure, Republicans could simply switch parties and thereby
gain access to the Democratic primary.  Republicans on Manhattan’s
Upper West Side today are obviously not in the same situation as Afri-
can Americans in Fort Bend, Texas circa 1950.  Yet the mutability of
party affiliation should be of no consequence as a matter of doctrine.
Fourteenth Amendment precedent makes clear that the right to vote
cannot be made contigent on ideological commitments.  Otherwise
qualified voters may not be carved out of the electorate simply be-
cause they do not share the values or perspectives of the majority of
other voters.15  Accordingly, where the majority party’s primary is the
only locus of meaningful electoral decision making, that primary
should be the election in which all voters are entitled to participate
regardless of party affiliation.
This proposition is, of course, not law.  It stands in tension with
three decades of precedent in which the Supreme Court has demon-
strated ever-increasing solicitude for the associational rights of politi-
cal parties.16  Not until California Democratic Party v. Jones,17 however,
did the Court expressly repudiate the notion that meaningful political
participation requires access to a competitive electoral process.  Jones
flatly denies that voters have a right to participate in the primary of a
13
See infra notes 133-44 and accompanying text (discussing this case law).
14
Infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
15
See infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text (discussing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972), and Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 69 (1965)).
16
See infra notes 147-60 and accompanying text (reviewing Supreme Court prece-
dent discussing parties’ associational rights).
17
530 U.S. 567 (2000).
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party in which they are not members, regardless of whether the gen-
eral election is a competitive or a perfunctory affair.18  Jones thereby
makes clear that a party’s associational freedom to define its primary
electorate need not be sacrificed when that primary is the determina-
tive election.  This associational right trumps any interest minority-
party voters possess in influencing electoral outcomes.19  In short, Jones
holds that Smith and Terry do not extend beyond racially exclusive
primary elections.20
Part II argues that even if Smith and Terry are limited to instances
of racial discrimination, the Court’s present disregard for the impor-
tance of electoral competition significantly erodes those decisions.
Assuming Smith and Terry do no more than prevent a political party
from manipulating the racial composition of its primary electorate,
the associational right underlying decisions like Jones restores the abil-
ity to do just that.
This power devolves to the Democratic Party in particular because
African Americans vote overwhelmingly for Democratic candidates.21
And this power is a significant one, given that the racial composition
of Democratic primaries often dictates the influence racial minorities
exert in the political process, particularly as competitive districts be-
come more scarce and racial bloc voting among Democrats declines.22
18
See id. at 573 n.5 (spurning the notion that “the ‘fundamental right’ to cast a
meaningful vote [is] really at issue in this context”); infra notes 162-64 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Jones).
19
See Jones, 530 U.S. at 583 (rejecting contention that inability “to participate in
what amounts to the determinative election” constitutes disenfranchisement); infra
notes 175-76 and accompanying text (discussing Jones).
20
See Jones, 530 U.S. at 583-84 (stating that exclusion from a party primary does
not constitute disenfranchisement); see also infra text accompanying notes 168, 175-78
(discussing Jones’s relation to Smith and Terry).
21
See, e.g., infra note 189.
22
Vast attention has been paid to the question of how the racial makeup of an
electoral district affects the political power of racial minorities, specifically of the Afri-
can American community.  See generally SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN &
RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY:  LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL
PROCESS 673-981 (Rev. 2d ed. 2002); DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN,
ELECTION LAW 163-354 (2d ed. 2001).  Less studied, but just as crucial, is the fact that
the choice of primary structure and the resulting racial composition of the district’s
primary electorate shapes the scope of minority influence.  For examples of scholar-
ship addressing the pivotal role of the primary, see Bernard Grofman et al., Drawing
Effective Minority Districts:  A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 1383, 1409-11 (2001); Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself?
Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1534 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself?].
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The Democratic Party may assert its associational interest in ex-
cluding nonmembers from its primary to increase the proportion of
black voters in the primary electorate.  There are two reasons why the
Democratic Party might want to manipulate the racial composition of
its primary electorate in this manner.  First, as explained in Part II.A,
doing so enables the Party to create an electorate likely to elect an Af-
rican American representative.  And a black presence in the legisla-
ture, and not simply a Democratic one, may be necessary to produce
policies black voters generally support and hence to maintain black
support for the Democratic Party.  Black candidates and legislators
may also be essential to energize black voters and to ensure that they
turn out on election day.23
The Democratic Party may consequently want to promote descrip-
tive black representation.  For more than a decade, the majority-
minority district (as opposed to the majority-minority primary) has
been a dominant method of doing this.  Yet, concentrating black vot-
ers in majority-black districts tends to place fewer Democrats in office
than does dispersing these voters among several districts.24  The major-
ity-minority primary, in contrast to the majority-minority district, con-
stitutes a vehicle by which the party may foster descriptive black repre-
sentation (and its consequent benefits for the party) without generating the
political losses often associated with the majority-minority district.25
Part II.B discusses the second reason why the Democratic Party
might invoke the associational interest underlying Jones to concentrate
black voters in the primary electorate.  To minimize Democratic in-
fluence, a districting plan produced by Republicans will concentrate
in a single district the maximum number of black voters possible
within constitutional and statutory constraints.26  Democrats may re-
spond by excluding nonmembers from the party primary in such dis-
tricts, thereby concentrating black voters even more.  This Part argues
that in a safe Democratic district, concentrating black voters in this
manner may result in racial vote dilution through “packing,” and thus
may require redistricting to resolve the clash between the party’s asso-
23
See infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text (discussing the link between
Democratic electoral success and the black electorate).
24
See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text (noting that dispersing black vot-
ers might increase substantive representation at the cost of descriptive representation).
25
See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60-61, 142
(1967) (defining descriptive and substantive representation); see also Georgia v. Ash-
croft, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 2512, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (citing PITKIN, supra, at 60-91, 114).
26
See infra note 231 and accompanying text (discussing Ashcroft).
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ciational right and the minority voters’ right to protection from racial
vote dilution.  The Democratic Party may thereby force redistricting
and thus disperse among several districts the minority voters a Repub-
lican-controlled legislature has concentrated in a single district.  In
other words, it may use its power to manipulate the racial composition
of its primary electorate to counter an unfavorable partisan gerry-
mander.27
Part II.C evaluates a recent case in light of these observations.  It
discusses Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney’s 2002 defeat in the
Democratic primary in Georgia’s Fourth Congressional District and
the lawsuit that followed, which unsuccessfully sought to establish that
the state’s open primary caused racial vote dilution within the mean-
ing of the Voting Rights Act.
The Conclusion draws a parallel between the authority the Demo-
cratic Party now enjoys to control the partisan and racial composition
of its primary and the power it exercised a century ago to operate the
white primary.  It explores the ramifications of this parallel in light of
the Court’s decision last Term in Vieth v. Jubelirer,28 in which it refused
to impose meaningful curbs on partisan gerrymandering.
The white primary, as originally incarnated, is not coming back.
The Supreme Court decisions outlawing the practice have become
“untouchable icons” of civil rights history,29 such that even their
staunchest critics do not call for their reversal.30  Recent developments
nevertheless give rise to a legal regime much like the one that sup-
ported the exclusion of African American voters from determinative
party primaries in the Jim Crow South.
27
See, e.g., infra notes 250-51 and accompanying text (noting that a closed Demo-
cratic primary might result in “packing” and racial vote dilution).
28
124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004).
29
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 11, at 652.
30
See, e.g., id. at 652 n.24 (citing Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Ma-
jor Political Parties:  A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1749 (1993)); Lowenstein,
supra, at 1748-52 (describing the White Primary Cases as being doctrinally problematic).
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I.  CONTROLLING THE PARTISAN COMPOSITION OF THE PRIMARY
ELECTORATE
A.   The Right to Vote in Primary Elections
Between 1927 and 1953, the Supreme Court struck down as un-
constitutional four attempts to block African American voters from
participating in primary elections in Texas.  The first two of these
White Primary Cases, Nixon v. Herndon31 and Nixon v. Condon,32 read the
Fourteenth Amendment to proscribe a white primary expressly man-
dated by state law and one authorized by the Texas Democratic Party’s
Executive Committee pursuant to a state law granting the committee
authority to define party membership.  Texas Democrats responded
by restoring the white primary through a mechanism less directly tied
to legislative action, namely as the decision of the party’s state conven-
tion, ostensibly made wholly independently of the state legislature.33
While the Court initially upheld the practice, failing to locate dis-
criminatory action by any state official,34 Smith v. Allwright 35 struck it
down as a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.  Terry v. Adams36 fol-
lowed thereafter, holding the Fifteenth Amendment to proscribe the
all-white “preprimary” sponsored by a group called the Jaybird Demo-
cratic Association.
Scholars have long studied the White Primary Cases, both because
they constitute a “bright spot” in federal anti-discrimination law prior
to Brown v. Board of Education,37 and because they set forth an expan-
31
273 U.S. 536 (1927).
32
286 U.S. 73 (1932).
33
This independence is highly questionable given that Texas, like much of the
South at the time, was a one-party State.  As a result, actions of the Democratic Party
cannot be easily separated from those of the Texas government.  See Robert Bischetto
et al., Texas, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH:  THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT 1965-1990, at 234 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994)
(describing the Democratic Party’s longstanding domination of Texas politics).
34
See  Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 53 (1935) (declaring an inability to “char-
acterize the managers of the primary election as state officers” whose acts satisfied the
state action requirement).
35
321 U.S. 649 (1944).
36
345 U.S. 461 (1953).
37
347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Lowenstein, supra note 30, at 1749 (offering this charac-
terization); see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
14.33(a) (4th ed. 1991) (“The White Primary Cases represented the major effort by the
court prior to the 1960’s to prevent racial discrimination in voting.” (citation omit-
ted)).
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sive and difficult conception of state action.38  The statute at issue in
Nixon v. Herndon expressly barred black participation in Democratic
Party primaries and accordingly presented a relatively straightforward
example of discriminatory state action.39  The subsequent cases, how-
ever, involved less readily apparent instances of discriminatory action
by a state actor and left the Court divided as to whether sufficient state
action existed upon which to identify a constitutional violation.
Focusing largely on Smith and Terry, scholars have chastised the
Court for manipulating the state action doctrine and damaging both
associational rights and constitutional interpretation in the process.40
According to this critique, the decisions leave vulnerable to constitu-
tional attack the membership practices of varied private entities.41
38
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 204 (2004)
[hereinafter KLARMAN, JIM CROW] (arguing that the Justices in Terry “subordinated
their understanding of law to politics in order to protect black suffrage”); Stephen E.
Gottlieb, Rebuilding the Right of Association:  The Right to Hold a Convention as a Test Case,
11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 191, 200-203 (1982) (describing a Supreme Court retreat from the
murky standards of Smith and Terry); Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings:  A
Case Study in the Consequences of Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55,
68-69 (2001) [hereinafter Klarman, White Primary] (noting criticism of Terry); Alan R.
Madry, Private Accountability and the Fourteenth Amendment; State Action, Federalism and
Congress, 59 MO. L. REV. 499, 508 (1994) (“The justification for this stretch [treating
political parties as state actors] is no less mysterious than the miracle of transubstantia-
tion.”); Michael L. Stokes, When Freedoms Conflict:  Party Discipline and the First Amend-
ment, 11 J.L. & POL. 751, 769-72 (1995) (arguing that post-Terry Supreme Court deci-
sions have attempted to cabin the “unwanted consequence” of applying the Bill of
Rights to private political parties); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Consti-
tutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26-29 (1959) (arguing that Smith and Terry were not
based on “neutral principles,” however desirable the result of black enfranchisement);
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 11, at 666 (criticizing Terry v. Adams for striking down
the Jaybird primary based on “a wholly fantastical conception of state action”).
39
See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927) (noting that the right to vote in
the Democratic primary derived from a Texas statute); cf. Brief for the State of Texas at
4, Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (No. 117), reprinted in 25 LANDMARK BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 361 (Philip B. Kur-
land & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975)) (arguing that the Democratic primary was a pri-
vate affair and that the statute authorizing white participation did not alter this status).
40
See, e.g., KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note 38, at 202 (discussing Terry’s “poorly
reasoned opinions”); John G. Kester, Constitutional Restrictions on Political Parties, 60 VA.
L. REV. 735, 758 (1974) (arguing that Terry “went too far” and that “[f]or the judiciary
now to place constitutional limitations on endorsements by a private group simply be-
cause the electorate respects and normally follows the group’s endorsements is noth-
ing less than a judicial subversion of the American political process.”).  But see Ronald
D. Rotunda, Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions on Political Parties in the Wake of  Cous-
ins v. Wigoda, 53 TEX. L. REV. 935, 955 (1975) (defending the White Primary Cases as
consistent with public function analysis).
41
See, e.g., Terry, 345 U.S. at 484, 494 (Minton, J., dissenting) (stating that the Jay-
birds’ “unworthy scheme” exerted pressure no different from that routinely exerted on
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More specifically, they strip political parties of most, if not all, associa-
tional rights.42  They curtail the mechanisms by which parties establish
their identities and implement their agendas,43 and thus the decisions
fail to adequately appreciate the institutional role political parties play
within the electoral system.44
The difficulty presented by Smith and Terry stems from the dra-
matic consequences that follow from designating a primary as the
product of state action.  The cases have traditionally been understood
to present an all-or-nothing proposition:  either a party primary con-
stitutes state action such that all constitutional constraints apply to all
of the primary’s rules and procedures, or a party primary is private ac-
tion wholly immune from constitutional attack.  By invalidating the
racially exclusive white primaries, Smith and Terry may certainly be
read to embrace the former proposition.
Judges and scholars dissatisfied with this rule, but nonetheless
loathe to repudiate Smith and Terry entirely,45 have attempted to read
“elections and other public business . . . by carefully organized groups”); Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 103-04 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s
approach left vulnerable to constitutional invalidation the “rules and by-laws of social
or business clubs, corporations, and religious associations . . . organized under charters
or general enactments”); see also Klarman, White Primary, supra note 38, at 68 (arguing
that the various rationales for state action in Terry are unpersuasive and that “[t]he
principal difficulty for the Justices involved drawing a line between the Jaybirds’ dis-
criminatory political scheme . . . and the discriminatory political preferences of private
individuals”); cf. Persily, Functional Defense, supra note 6, at 765 (arguing that party or-
ganizations differ from other private organizations in that their membership rules are
typically the product of state law).
42
See, e.g., Garrett, Is the Party Over?, supra note 11, at 111 (“[T]he Court’s reason-
ing in the White Primary Cases does not have a logical stopping-place that would allow
courts to differentiate among political actors.”); Kester, supra note 40, at 737-60 (criti-
cizing judicial intervention into primaries as too far-reaching).
43
See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1549 (4th ed. 2001)
(suggesting that the Jaybirds might have had “a plausible first amendment complaint”
had the state attempted to regulate participation in their preprimary, and questioning
why the “Jaybirds’ ‘freedom to identify the people who constitute[d] the association’
[was not] constitutionally protected”); Lowenstein, supra note 30, at 1748 (arguing that
the White Primary Cases appear to strip political parties “of the protections of the Bill of
Rights”).
44
See, e.g., Persily, Functional Defense, supra note 6, at 753 (arguing that laws limit-
ing a party’s right to exclude impair the ability of parties generally to “enhanc[e] com-
petition and foster[] representation of minorities and interest groups”).
45
See, e.g., Issacharaoff & Pildes, supra note 11, at 652 (describing the White Primary
Cases as “untouchable icons”); Lowenstein, supra note 30, at 1749 (noting that “few
commentators and no courts have suggested the disavowal of the White Primary Cases”
and arguing that “to declare that the cases were wrong would be unpleasant, even disil-
lusioning”).  But see James S. Fay, The Legal Regulation of Political Parties, 9 J. LEGIS. 263,
277-78 (1982) (suggesting the cases be rejected).
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the holdings more narrowly and thereby cabin the seeming expan-
siveness of their state action analyses.  Some deem the decisions inco-
herent but necessary holdings limited to the “unique” circumstances
in which the cases arose.46  Some posit that political parties are distinct
from other types of private organizations to which the state actor des-
ignation remains inapplicable.47  Finally, some insist the decisions are
doctrinally confined to instances of racial discrimination.48
A promising alternative reading is available.  Underlying Smith and
Terry is a vibrant understanding of the right to vote and a conception
of political participation that recognizes and rejects the core purpose
of the racially exclusive primary.  The white primary was meant to
deny black voters the opportunity to influence electoral outcomes.
Smith and Terry, in turn, recognized that the right to vote must en-
compass this opportunity for influence.
Professors Issacharoff and Pildes have explained that the white
primary emerged a century ago as a “precommitment pact” among
white voters, an agreement that even when they vehemently disagreed
with one another, white voters would not “seek to prevail through
making common cause with black voters.”49  The prospect of such alli-
ances was hardly illusory.  The state constitutional conventions held
throughout the former Confederacy at the turn of the twentieth cen-
46
See Persily, Functional Defense, supra note 6, at 755-58 (discussing this reading of
the White Primary Cases).
47
See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 11, at 655 (arguing that the statutory system
for selection of party nominees in cases such as Smith rendered the party a state actor);
Persily, Functional Defense, supra note 6, at 765-66 (distinguishing membership practices
of political parties from practices of other types of organizations).
48
See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 573 (2000) (viewing the
cases as limited to the Fifteenth Amendment context); Wymbs v. Republican State Ex-
ecutive Comm. of Fla., 719 F.2d 1072, 1077 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding that courts have
been reluctant to characterize party activity as state action absent racial discrimina-
tion); Ripon Soc’y, Inc. v. Nat’l Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(en banc) (Tamm, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the White Primary Cases involved
racial discrimination); see also Bruce E. Cain, Party Autonomy and Two-Party Electoral
Competition, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 802, 805 (2001) (arguing that the only exceptions
to a laissez faire approach to party regulation should be to prevent racial discrimina-
tion and to ensure well-ordered balloting); David Lubecky, Comment, Setting Voter
Qualifications for State Primary Elections:  Reassertion of the Right of State Political Parties to
Self-Determination, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 799, 809 n.57 (1987) (reading Smith and Terry to
be primarily about race).
49
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 11, at 662-63.  Thus, “[f]ar from being driven
solely by racial ideology . . . the white primary was a vehicle through which existing
partisan forces leveraged their current political power into a state-imposed lockup that
would channel emergent partisan challenges into the least threatening form, namely,
internal Democratic Party factional struggle.”  Id.
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tury expressly sought to disenfranchise black voters.50  The political
reality that preceded the conventions, however, was far more fluid
than the conventioneers’ rhetoric suggested.51  The Solid South had
yet to emerge,52 and repeated third-party challenges threatened any
promise of Democratic hegemony.53  The Populists were but one of
several insurgent political movements that, at least initially, courted
black voters as a potentially decisive voting block.54  The Democrats
themselves were an amalgam of factions, divided over a variety of eco-
nomic and political issues.55
Confronted with internal division and the prospect of viable third-
party challenges, the Democratic Party sought to channel policy dis-
agreements among white voters through party-controlled mecha-
50
See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (noting historical as-
sessment that the “Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901 was part of a movement
that swept the post-Reconstruction South to disenfranchise blacks”); Harman v.
Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 543 (1965) (“The Virginia poll tax was born of a desire to
disenfranchise the Negro.”); United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 363 (E.D.
La. 1963) (“[T]he State[] [had a] historic policy and the dominant white citizens[]
[had a] firm determination to maintain white supremacy in state and local govern-
ment by denying to Negroes the right to vote.”), aff’d, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); see also
ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 22, at 101 (“Every state in the Deep South adopted a
new constitution between 1890 and 1908, and every constitution employed at least one,
and often several . . . disenfranchising devices.”).
51
See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST.
COMMENT. 295, 312 (2000) ( “[H]istorical moments are often more contingent than
they look generations down the road . . . . [T]he political culture of disfranchisement
was more fluid and precarious, in some states even more than others, than it appears
in hindsight . . . .”).
52
See William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 170
(2001) (discussing the Solid South from 1937 to 1945).
53
See, e.g., ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 22, at 98 (“[O]n the very eve of disen-
franchisement in North Carolina, there were still substantial, interracial political coali-
tions that allowed a fusion of political parties, with black and white support, to control
the North Carolina legislature as late as 1894-1898.”); Lawrence C. Goodwyn, Populist
Dreams and Negro Rights:  East Texas as a Case Study, 76 AM. HIST. REV. 1435, 1438-39
(1971) (describing Populist appeal to both black and white voters that allowed tempo-
rary victories over Democrats).
54
See STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS:  VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-
1969, at 23-24 (1976) (noting that there were “counties where blacks remained on the
rolls and white candidates actively competed for their ballots”); Goodwyn, supra note
53, at 1437, 1448 (describing populist appeal); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 11, at
663 (describing the heavily fractured political climate that marked the rise of the
southern populist movement); Burton D. Wechsler, Black and White Disenfranchisement:
Populism, Race, and Class, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 23, 25-26 (2002) (same).
55
See, e.g., ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 22, at 117 (“Historically, the Texas
Democratic Party was a rather diverse and unstable mix of both conservative and popu-
list currents that divided quite sharply over issues such as the New Deal.”).
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nisms.56  According to Issacharoff and Pildes, the white primary was “a
sustained effort to preserve to white voters exclusive control over the
locus of decisional power.”57  And, while it lasted, the white primary
was hugely successful in establishing and maintaining the hegemony
of the Democratic Party.58
This success necessarily depended upon noncompetitive general
elections.  So long as the racially restrictive Democratic primary was
the only juncture for meaningful electoral decision making, cross-
racial appeals and political alliances served little purpose.  White
Democrats resolved all disputes among themselves.  A competitive
general election would have undermined this system by providing an
arena in which black and white voters could “mak[e] common cause”
with one another.59  The white primary accordingly was specifically de-
signed “to ensure that black voters could not influence the decisive
political issues of the day.”60
Smith and Terry recognized this purpose and held that the consti-
tutionally protected right to vote encompasses precisely this opportu-
nity to influence outcomes.61  The decisions offer a conception of vot-
56
See DEWEY W. GRANTHAM, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE SOLID SOUTH 22 (1988)
(“The primary provided a vehicle for intraparty competition, and it helped abolish the
minority party’s last remaining resource, its monopoly of opposition.”); id. at 28 (The
primary facilitated the reabsorption of Populists and other dissidents into Democratic
ranks . . . .”); V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 609 (3d ed.
1952) (describing the white primary as a means “by which battles between the Whites
could be fought out within the Democratic Party, from which the Negro could be ex-
cluded”); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 11, at 663 (describing how Populists engaged
in the white primary as a means to avoid the “albatross” of reliance on black votes); cf.
WARD E. Y. ELLIOTT, THE RISE OF GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY 72 (1974) (“[T]he white
primary did not of itself defeat the Republicans and Populists, did not turn the tide
against the blacks and upcountry whites, but consolidated a victory already won.”).
57
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 11, at 653; see also ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE
RIGHT TO VOTE 247 (2000) (“[S]ince electoral outcomes invariably were determined
in primaries, [the white primary] was an extremely tidy and efficient vehicle for black
disfranchisement.”).
58
See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS 72 (1974) (not-
ing that the white primary was a chief reason for the failure of a two-party system in the
South).
59
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 11, at 662-63; see also supra note 49 and accom-
panying text (describing the use of the white primary to avoid the factionalization of
the Democratic Party).
60
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 11, at 653.
61
From the initial challenge in Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), the NAACP
viewed the determinative nature of the white primary as the central reason for its un-
constitutionality.  See, e.g., LAWSON, supra note 54, at 25-26 (quoting NAACP Executive
Secretary James Weldon Johnson as saying that “[s]ince the Democratic primary con-
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ing that transcends the mechanical act of casting a ballot in the gen-
eral election and embraces instead the opportunity to participate
meaningfully in the electoral process.  So conceived, the right to vote
requires an opportunity to engage in political debate with others at
the juncture of the electoral process where participation can matter.62
At this juncture, candidates vie for a voter’s support, modifying policy
proposals and offering the political spoils that generate loyalty.  Here,
voters determine and reorder priorities, debate and refine policy
preferences, and confront the obligation to “pull, haul, and trade,” to
borrow the phrase the Court used much later to describe the essence
of political participation.63  In short, Smith and Terry suggest that the
right to vote, as protected by the Constitution, is the right to vote in a
competitive election.64
This conception of the right to vote originated in United States v.
Classic, a 1941 decision that held that election fraud committed dur-
ing a congressional primary in Louisiana violated a federal statute bar-
ring interference with “any right or privilege secured to [a U.S. citi-
zen] by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”65  The difficult
stitutes the entire machinery of election to office in most Southern states, this case in-
volves the only effective way of striking a blow for the Negro’s right to vote”).
62
This juncture need not be the general election.  See Persily, In Defense, supra note
4, at 661-62 (“There is no obvious reason why competitive primaries would not pro-
duce the same advantages of responsiveness, accountability, and ‘ritual cleansing’ . . .
attribut[ed] to competitive general elections.”).
While a meeting in the fabled smoke-filled room may dictate electoral outcomes,
Smith and Terry fall short of requiring that all voters have access to that room.  Such a
meeting is less obviously part of the electoral process than is a party primary in which
voters cast ballots.  The ability, moreover, of such limited action to control electoral
results signals the existence of fundamental defects in the electoral process as it is con-
ventionally understood.
63
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994).
64
The first white primary decision, Herndon, 237 U.S. at 536, alluded to the cen-
trality of the Democratic primary within the State’s electoral system, emphasizing the
importance of primary elections, and noting that they “may determine the final result”
in general elections.  Id. at 540; see also S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm. v. Eu, 826
F.2d 814, 826 n.21 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that the White Primary Cases are limited to an
“unusual context:  a state-mandated racially discriminatory primary scheme in a one-
party state where nomination is tantamount to election”), aff’d, 489 U.S. 214 (1989);
Ripon Soc’y, Inc. v. Nat’l Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en
banc) (Tamm, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the Democratic Primary “was the
election” in Texas at the time); Republican Party of Conn. v. Tashjian, 599 F. Supp.
1228, 1233 (D. Conn. 1984) (noting that victory in the Democratic primary in Texas
was “tantamount to election to public office”), aff’d, 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
65
313 U.S. 299, 309 (1941) (quoting section 19 of the Criminal Code, then codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 51).  The defendants in Classic were also charged with violating sec-
tion 20 of the Criminal Code, then codified at 18 U.S.C. § 52, which prohibited anyone
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issue in Classic was identifying the federal right or privilege with which
the fraud had interfered.  Twenty years earlier, the Supreme Court
had split four to four on the question whether a primary election con-
stituted an election within the meaning of Article I, Section 4 of the
Constitution.66  Classic dispensed with this uncertainty.  It held that the
right of voters participating in a congressional primary “to have their
votes counted is . . . a right or privilege secured by the Constitution,”67
where either state law makes the congressional primary “an integral
part of the procedure of choice, or where in fact the primary effec-
tively controls the choice [of representative].”68
Classic undermined Grovey v. Townsend,69 which had unanimously
held that state regulation alone was insufficient to render the all-white
Democratic primary authorized by the party’s state convention a pub-
lic affair subject to constitutional limitations.70  To be sure, Classic did
not mention Grovey, and its focus on congressional elections as gov-
erned by Article I, sections 2 and 4,71 did not directly speak to the
question of state action under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments.72  The earlier decision, however, was nevertheless “doomed,” as
acting “under color of any law” from “willfully subject[ing], or caus[ing] to be sub-
jected, any inhabitant of any State . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, and
immunities secured and protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”
313 U.S. at 309-10 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 52 (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 242
(2000))).
66
Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921); see Classic, 313 U.S. at 317 (de-
scribing Court’s vote breakdown in Newberry); see also U.S. CONST. art I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall
be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Sena-
tors.”).
67
313 U.S. at 325.
68
Id. at 318.
69
295 U.S. 45 (1935).
70
Id. at 53-54.
71
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“[T]he Electors in each State shall have the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legisla-
ture.”); U.S. CONST. art. I., § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elec-
tions for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legisla-
ture thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”).
72
See KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note 38, at 198 (“Grovey involved the question of
whether party regulation of primaries constituted state action under the Fifteenth
Amendment, whereas Classic raised the question of whether primaries were elections
under Article I, section 4.”); LAWSON, supra note 54, at 363 n.75 (“Stone based his con-
clusion on Article I . . . and not on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  Article
I applies to both private and state action.”).
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Chief Justice Stone subsequently remarked, as soon as Classic came
down.73
Classic’s first prong, whether state law makes the congressional
primary “an integral part of the procedure of choice,”74 provided a
framework to overcome the state action obstacles identified in
Grovey.75  The same factors that rendered the primary integral to the
election in Classic suggested that the white primary authorized by the
Democratic Party’s convention was integral to the election in Texas.76
For the decision in Classic, this link sufficed to implicate the constitu-
tional right to choose a congressional representative.  For the decision
in Smith, this link would now suffice to constitute state action:  indeed,
Smith invoked “the place of the primary in the electoral scheme” and
its similarity in structure to the Louisiana regime at issue in Classic as
providing the state action deemed lacking in Grovey.77
This conclusion would have sufficed to overturn Grovey.  Based on
this state action finding alone, the Court could have struck down the
Texas primary as embodying invidious racial discrimination in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Such a holding would have fol-
lowed plainly from the first two white primary decisions, Nixon v.
Herndon and Nixon v. Condon.78  Both of these earlier decisions in-
volved express discrimination based on race that could be traced to a
state actor and struck down the challenged white primary without ad-
73
KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note 38, at 198; see also LAWSON, supra note 54, at 38,
41 (noting that Classic “laid the foundation for getting the Grovey ruling overturned”
and stating that “only the myopic missed Stone’s handwriting on the wall”).
74
Classic, 313 U.S. at 318.
75
Grovey, 295 U.S. at 48.
76
These factors included whether the primary was conducted at public expense,
whether the State regulated the time, place, and manner of the primary, and whether
“an unsuccessful candidate at the primary may . . . offer himself as a candidate at a
general election, and that votes for him may . . . lawfully be written into the ballot or
counted at such an election.”  Classic, 313 U.S. at 313.
77
See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 660 (1944) (noting that the integral nature
of the primary “makes clear that state delegation to a party of the power to fix the qualifi-
cations of primary elections is delegation of a state function that may make the party’s ac-
tion the action of the state”).
78
See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 84, 89 (1932) (holding that the white primary
authorized by the Democratic Party’s State Executive Committee pursuant to state law
constituted invidious racial discrimination in contravention of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and declining to address the white primary’s impact on voting rights in
particular); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1927) (describing the state stat-
ute barring black participation in Democratic Party primaries as “a direct and obvious
infringement of the Fourteenth [Amendment],” so clear as to render consideration of
the plaintiffs’ Fifteenth Amendment claim unnecessary).
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dressing the question whether the practice implicated constitutionally
protected voting rights.79
Classic did more, however, than simply offer the Court a roadmap
around the state action barrier from Grovey.  Classic’s second prong,
whether “in fact the primary effectively controls the choice [of repre-
sentative],”80 provided the groundwork for finding more specifically
that the white primary abridged the right to vote.  Classic held that a
determinative congressional primary implicates the constitutional
right to choose one’s representative, regardless of how pervasively or
negligibly the state regulates the primary process.81  Classic thus pos-
ited a conception of constitutionally protected political participation
in a competitive electoral process.  Both Smith and Terry relied on this
conception in holding that the white primary violated the Fifteenth
Amendment.  These holdings required the Court to find not only dis-
criminatory state action, but discriminatory state action that denied or
abridged the right to vote.
Smith rested on both prongs of Classic’s test for assessing whether a
form of political participation is constitutionally protected.  Smith con-
cluded that state law made the Democratic primary an integral part of its
electoral machinery.82  But Smith’s identification of a Fifteenth
Amendment violation did not only stem from this conclusion.  Smith
also suggested that the primary implicated the constitutionally pro-
tected right to vote because it operated in conjunction with a state re-
79
See Smith, 321 U.S. at 660 (noting that the Nixon cases were decided under the
Fourteenth Amendment “without a determination of the status of the primary as a part
of the electoral process”); Brief for the State of Texas at 3, Nixon v. Herndon, 237 U.S.
536 (1927) (No. 117) reprinted in 25 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 39, at 361 (“Partici-
pation in a nominating primary of a political party is not protected nor guaranteed by
the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”); see also ELLIOTT,
supra note 56, at 73 (stating that the Court’s reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment
held “some tactical advantage” by providing a remedy without requiring the Court to
decide whether a primary was an “election” within the meaning of the Fifteenth
Amendment).
80
Classic, 313 U.S. at 318; see also LAWSON, supra note 54, at 50 (noting emphasis
by NAACP in its challenge to South Carolina’s unregulated white primary in Rice v. El-
more that Classic offered two independent tests for assessing whether the Constitution
applied to a primary election, namely whether the primary was integral or whether it
“‘in fact . . . effectively controls choice’”) (quoting Brief for Appellees at 7, 8, 13, 14,
Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1948) (No. 5664)).
81
See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 9, 24, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299
(1941) (No. 618) (emphasizing that the Democratic primary determines the victor in
the general election).
82
See LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 22, at 453 (“Texas’ detailed regulation
and involvement in the primary process turned that process into a state function, even
though it was conducted by the ostensibly private Democratic Party.”).
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gime that made the primary election the determinative election.
Smith spoke of the constitutional right “to participate in the choice of
elected officials,”83 free from racial discrimination, and emphasized
that this “opportunity for choice is not to be nullified by a state
through casting its electoral process in a form which permits a private
organization to practice racial discrimination in the election.”84
At the time, of course, the Democratic primary in Texas consti-
tuted the only election of consequence.  Insofar as the Texas govern-
ment could be distinguished from the Democratic Party itself,85 the
State had not directly mandated the racially discriminatory primary at
issue in Smith.  It had, nevertheless, “cast[] its electoral process in a
form” that permitted the Democratic Party to exclude African Ameri-
can voters from the only opportunity meaningfully to choose repre-
sentatives.86  The State had accordingly “nullified” the “opportunity
for choice” that the Constitution protects.87  By focusing on this lost
“opportunity for choice,” Smith suggested that the right to vote tran-
scends participation in the general election where elected officials are
in fact chosen elsewhere.
This suggestion became the core of Terry’s holding.  Every white
Democratic voter in Fort Bend County was automatically eligible to
participate in the Jaybird primary.88  Thus, to the extent that the
Democratic primary was integral to the county’s electoral system, the
Jaybird Association’s preprimary could have been deemed so as well.
By the time Terry reached the Court, however, the Justices saw that
meaningful black participation in party primaries would not be real-
ized if the invalidity of the white primary rested exclusively on the in-
tegral nature of the primary within an electoral system.  South Caro-
lina had responded to Smith by eliminating state regulation of the
83
321 U.S. at 664.
84
Id.
85
See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 11, at 653-54 (noting that the Democratic
Party “had a complete monopoly on politics in Texas” and that when the “State” acted,
“this was tantamount to the Democratic Party using state law to self-regulate”).
86
Smith, 321 U.S. at 664.
87
Id.
88
During the late 1880s, white residents in Fort Bend County formed the Young
Men’s Democratic Club of Fort Bend County, an organization designed to end black
political participation in the county.  The Club split shortly after forming into the Jay-
birds and Woodpeckers, with the Jaybirds soon emerging as the dominant group by
1890.  DARLENE CLARK HINE, BLACK VICTORY:  THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE
PRIMARY IN TEXAS 34 (Harold M. Hyman ed., 1979); see also Issacharoff & Pildes, supra
note 11, at 656-57 (describing the Jaybirds’ domination of the county’s politics).
2004] RESURRECTING THE WHITE PRIMARY 343
state primary entirely.89  The white primary the Democratic Party pre-
dictably implemented in response ostensibly operated independently
of state regulation.  The State provided no funding, and issued no
edicts about participation in the primary, either for candidates or vot-
ers.90  The primary nevertheless provided the decisive juncture for
electoral decision making.  Like its predecessor, it blocked black par-
ticipation at the only point where it could have mattered.  For this
reason, the district court and the Fourth Circuit struck it down under
the Fifteenth Amendment.91
The Supreme Court followed suit in Terry.92  The Jaybird primary
lacked the trappings of direct state regulation that had supported
Smith’s finding that the Democratic primary was integral to the Texas
electoral process.93  Justice Clark’s concurring opinion charged that
the Jaybird primary was “an auxiliary” of the Democratic primary, but
that relationship stemmed more from the role performed by the Jay-
bird regime within the electoral system than from direct formal con-
trol by the Democratic Party.94  Indeed, the plurality opinions in Terry
largely abandon any search for regulatory control of the sort typically
deemed sufficient to implicate constitutional requirements.  The Jus-
89
See Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387, 388 (4th Cir. 1947) (“[T]he primary laws of
the state were repealed and the Democratic primary was conducted thereafter under
rules prescribed by the Democratic party.”); see also King v. Chapman, 62 F. Supp. 639,
649-50 (M.D. Ga. 1945) (holding that a party primary is part of the “election machin-
ery” subject to state and federal law even though the state did not require parties to
hold primaries and the primaries were privately regulated), aff’d, 154 F.2d 460 (5th
Cir. 1946).
90
See Rice, 165 F.2d at 388 (noting that the State no longer regulated primary elec-
tions).
91
See id. at 391-92 (stating that because “‘the choice of candidates at the Demo-
cratic primary determines the choice of the elected representative,’” the white primary
denies the African American voter “any effective voice in the government of his coun-
try” (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 319 (1941))); Elmore v. Rice, 72 F.
Supp. 516, 527-28 (D.S.C.) (finding that the Constitution mandated black participa-
tion in the Democratic primary so long as that primary was “the only material and real-
istic election”), aff’d, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947) .
92
Terry was the product of a divided court, and no single opinion garnered the
support of five justices.
93
See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 662-63 (1944) (noting elected officials’ in-
volvement in and statutory regulation of the white primary at issue).
94
See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 483-84 (1953) (Clark, J., concurring) (stating
that “the Jaybird Democratic Association operate[d] as an auxiliary of the local Demo-
cratic Party organization” and “[was] the decisive power in the county’s recognized
electoral process”).
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tices were concerned instead with the Jaybird primary’s critical func-
tion within the county’s electoral system.95
Justice Black’s opinion, joined by Justices Douglas and Burton,
recognized that the Jaybird primary was “[t]he only election that
ha[d] counted in this Texas county for more than fifty years.”96  The
subsequent Democratic primary and general election were “perfunc-
tory ratifiers of the choice that ha[d] already been made in Jaybird
elections.”97  The system functioned “to deny Negroes on account of
their race an effective voice in the governmental affairs of their coun-
try, state, or community.”98  Justice Black thereby equated the right to
vote with the right to an “effective voice” in governance, meaning that
constitutional limitations would apply when the effect of an electoral
regime would be to thwart that voice.  Direct state regulation of the
primary is not essential.  It is sufficient that the State “permit within its
borders” a regime like the Jaybird primary, which functioned as “the
only effective part[] of the elective process that determines who shall
rule and govern in the county.”99  The consequence of this system “is
to do precisely that which the Fifteenth Amendment forbids—strip
Negroes of every vestige of influence in selecting the officials who
control the local county matters that intimately touch the daily lives of
citizens.”100
Justice Clark’s concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Vinson
and Justices Reed and Jackson, substantially agreed.  Acknowledging
that the Democratic primary was “nominally open” to black voters,
Justice Clark wrote that a vote at this juncture “must be an empty vote
cast after the real decisions are made.”101  Because the party primary
and general election were noncompetitive, “the Negro minority’s vote
[was] nullified at the sole stage of the local political process where the
bargaining and interplay of rival political forces would make it
count.”102  The Jaybird primary constituted “the locus of effective po-
litical choice.”103  Constitutional constraints applied because the State
95
See ELLIOTT, supra note 56, at 81 (“[T]he Court in Terry acted on the strength of
function plus [party] membership to apply the Fifteenth Amendment.”).
96
Terry, 345 U.S. at 469.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 466.
99
Id. at 469.
100
Id. at 470.
101
Id. at 484 (Clark, J., concurring).
102
Id.
103
Id.
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had structured its electoral regime to “devolve[] upon a political or-
ganization the uncontested choice of public officials.”104
Professors Issacharoff and Pildes argue that the Jaybird primary
was distinct from the white primaries struck down in the three earlier
white primary decisions because it did “not involve any use at all of the
state election machinery to lock up power for existing forces.”105  As
they point out, the exclusionary rules at issue in Herndon, Condon, and
Smith stymied robust political competition because the State had ren-
dered the cost of challenging the Democratic primary victor prohibi-
tive.106  State law accorded the primary winner a privileged position on
the ballot, and left those dissatisfied with the Democratic candidate
with the formidable task of creating a viable new party to nominate a
competitor.107  The cost of defection from the winner of the Jaybird
primary was less, given that those unhappy with the Jaybird-endorsed
candidate could, at least in principle, challenge that candidate within
the existing party structure.108  Insofar as the state’s poll tax and other
measures effectively blocked meaningful competition in the elections
that followed the Jaybird primary, legal challenges might be brought
against them, while still respecting the not inconsequential associa-
tional claims inhering in the Jaybirds’ “unworthy scheme.”109  Issacha-
roff and Pildes conclude that the Court in Terry should have inquired
why the elections subsequent to the Jaybird primary were noncompeti-
104
Id.; see also id. at 472 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“For the sixty years of the
Association’s existence, the candidate ultimately successful in the Democratic primary
for every county-wide office was the man indorsed by the Jaybird Association.”).
105
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 11, at 665.
106
See id. at 664-65 (“By raising the costs of challenge to insuperable heights, po-
litical insiders were able to lock up the market for control.”).
107
See id. at 665 (“To get on the general ballot, a candidate had to be nominated
by qualified voters who did not participate in any other party’s primary.”).
108
See id. (“Because the Jaybirds merely endorsed a candidate at the county party
primary, every decision could be undone at the party level.”).
109
See id. at 665-66; STONE ET AL., supra note 43, at 1549 (questioning whether the
“Jaybirds [might] have had a plausible first amendment complaint”); see also Terry, 345
U.S. at 484 (Minton, J., dissenting) (describing the Jaybird primary as an “unworthy
scheme” but asserting that the activities of the Jaybirds constituted private, rather than
state, action); LAWSON, supra note 54, at 23 (noting that prior to the imposition of the
white primary, “[i]n most areas Negroes had already lost their suffrage through in-
timidation and the inability to pay a poll tax and pass a literacy test”); Persily, Func-
tional Defense, supra note 6, at 758 (“It is pure folly to discuss party rights or the right to
vote in a primary election when the state indirectly or directly prohibits virtually all Af-
rican Americans in the jurisdiction from participating in the general election.”).
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tive, and that had it done so, it would have preserved both the Jaybird
primary and a less “fantastical conception of state action.”110
Terry need not, however, be dismissed as incoherent.  The Court’s
failure to examine the reasons why the elections that followed the Jay-
bird primary were noncompetitive suggests that it was less concerned
with why the Jaybird primary was determinative than with the fact that
it was.  The constitutional defect arose because the system functioned
as the critical juncture of electoral decision making, regardless of the
reasons why the Jaybirds were able to provide the only competitive
election in the county.  To be sure, had it been so inclined, Fort Bend
County could have structured its electoral process in a manner that
would have fostered competitive elections at points subsequent to the
Jaybird primary.111  So too, the State of Texas might have facilitated
competition in the general election following the all-white Democratic
primary at issue in Smith by, for example, relaxing the rules that hin-
dered independent and third-party candidacies.112  The failure of
these jurisdictions to take such actions rendered the white primaries
sponsored by the Democratic Party and the Jaybirds state action.
So understood, the Smith and Terry decisions expand the concept
of state action without leaving it wholly untethered.  The decisions fall
short of applying the Constitution to all party activity or even to all
party primaries.113  Instead, Smith and Terry more narrowly held that
the Constitution bars a competitive, racially exclusive party primary
where subsequent elections are noncompetitive.  The state action des-
ignation and the accompanying constitutional command apply be-
cause the primary functions as the locus of electoral decision making.
The right to vote is understood to encompass the right to participate
at this juncture.
Paradoxically, the broad conception of the right to vote that un-
derlies Smith and Terry suggests the Court’s unwillingness to counte-
nance the consequences that a more expansive state action doctrine
110
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 11, at 666.
111
See, e.g., LAWSON, supra note 54, at 23-24 (discussing the structure of southern
electoral processes).
112
See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 11, at 665 (describing rules that allowed the
Democratic Party to retain control).
113
See J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., MR. JUSTICE MURPHY:  A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY
356 (1968) (noting Chief Justice Stone’s emphasis at conference that Smith involved
“not all primaries but this primary”); cf. Persily, Functional Defense, supra note 6, at 767
(arguing that minor-party primaries are more difficult to characterize as state action
because such parties enjoy fewer state-bestowed benefits, play less of a role in crafting
electoral rules, and adhere to a more ideological agenda).
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might have produced.  The first two white primary decisions, Nixon v.
Herndon114 and Nixon v. Condon,115 relied exclusively on the Fourteenth
Amendment to invalidate the exclusionary practices at issue.  Signifi-
cantly, those cases did not address whether these practices implicated
the right to vote, finding instead that they constituted invidious dis-
crimination independent of any voting claim.116  Smith and Terry might
have followed Herndon and Condon and held that the challenged white
primaries violated the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of whether
they involved the right to vote at all.  Smith and Terry, however, in-
volved a weaker link between the challenged practice and state action
than had Herndon and Condon.  And since the Justices had yet to rec-
ognize expressly that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the right
to vote,117 a Fourteenth Amendment holding in Smith and Terry could
not have rested on the inclusive conception of meaningful political
participation that both decisions located under the Fifteenth.  Instead,
in order to find state action in Smith and Terry and still ground the
holding in the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court needed a theory of
state action that transcended the electoral realm.  A Fourteenth
Amendment holding would have required a broader principle of
equal opportunity, and therefore one that might have directly destabi-
lized the Jim Crow regime.
The Court’s reliance on the Fifteenth Amendment in Smith and
Terry may have reflected its reluctance to make this move, at least in
the years prior to Brown v. Board of Education.118  This reluctance, how-
ever, need not be interpreted as the Court’s indifference to claims of
racial discrimination not implicating the right to vote.  Indeed, Smith
and Terry may well illustrate the Court’s eagerness to announce broad
antidiscrimination principles during World War II and the Cold War
as a means of distinguishing American practice from that of fascist re-
gimes abroad.119  Yet the Court’s reliance in Smith and Terry on the Fif-
114
273 U.S. 536 (1927).
115
286 U.S. 73 (1932).
116
See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (discussing Herndon and Condon).
117
See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text (summarizing Equal Protection
Clause cases involving the right to vote).
118
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
119
See, e.g., Arthur Krock, Self Re-Examination Continues in the Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 1944, at 20 (stating that the “real reason” for Smith was that “the com-
mon sacrifices of wartimes have turned public opinion and the court against previously
sustained devices to exclude minorities from any privilege of citizenship”); see also
MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS:  RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 104 (2000) (arguing that national security concerns influenced the
Court’s Brown decision); HINE, supra note 88, at 236-37 (“The white primary was one of
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teenth Amendment, instead of the Fourteenth, suggests a commit-
ment to racial equality tempered by a strong allegiance to principles
of federalism.120  Basing Smith and Terry exclusively on the Fifteenth
Amendment held promise as a mechanism to revamp discriminatory
electoral practices and thereby foster effective and representative gov-
ernance at the state level.  Such governance, in turn, offered the
promise that the states themselves would combat discrimination pre-
vailing in other state institutions.  Thus, it might render more intru-
sive and extensive federal regulation unnecessary and be thought to
comport more faithfully with the federal structure.121
Implicit in this view is a belief in the transformative power of the
vote.  A meaningful opportunity to participate in the electoral process
promises not only instrumental benefits bestowed by sympathetic leg-
islators and favorable policies,122 but also more intrinsic benefits de-
rived from the exercise of the franchise itself.123  Meaningful participa-
tion in the electoral process enables voters to constitute themselves as
full citizens.  One perspective on federal power would limit federal in-
tervention in state affairs to ensuring that minority voters are able to
secure the constitutive and instrumental values of voting.  Affirm their
citizenship in this manner and they will be able to secure for them-
selves the benefits that derivatively follow.124
the casualties of World War II.”); KEYSSAR, supra note 57, at 248 (“[T]he justices were
not immune to events transpiring in the world around them . . . [and] were well aware
of the links between the ideological dimensions of World War II and the exclusion of
blacks from voting in the South.”); KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note 38, at 200 (“[T]he
justices cannot have missed the contradiction between a war purportedly being fought
for democratic ends and the pervasive disfranchisement of southern blacks.”);
RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 204 (1999) (arguing that
during the 1940s, “anti-Nazism fostered thicker rights against racial discrimination . . .
[and] the Court began construing the state action requirement extremely liberally
when doing so was necessary to vindicating the equal rights of blacks”).
120
Cf. ELLIOTT, supra note 56, at 74 (describing the Equal Protection Clause as a
“weak constitutional foundation” for Herndon).
121
See Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation:  Congressional Power to Enforce the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341,
2346 (2003) (arguing that this view may explain the Rehnquist and Waite Courts’ ap-
proach to congressional measures addressing racial discrimination in voting).
122
See LAWSON, supra note 54, at 24 (noting that blacks in the South at the turn of
the century were rewarded for their support of white Democratic candidates with
community improvements “including paved streets, new schools, a library, and a public
auditorium”).
123
See Ellen D. Katz, Race and the Right to Vote After Rice v. Cayetano, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 491, 512-14 (2000) (discussing these intrinsic benefits).
124
See Katz, supra note 121, at 2388 (discussing the assumption that individual lib-
erty is best protected by democratically accountable local governments).
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The whole purpose of the white primary, of course, was to block
meaningful black participation in the electoral process.  Divisions
among white Democratic voters meant that the preferences of even a
relatively small black population could be decisive, and thus the white
primary arose to keep black voters from swinging an election.125  White
Democrats averse to policies holding appeal for potential black voters
easily supported this regime.126  More puzzling, however, is the com-
mitment of white Democrats more inclined to align with black voters
on select policy issues.  To be sure, participation in interracial coali-
tions subjected white participants to charges of supporting “Negro
rule,” a charge that could generate a loss in support among white vot-
ers greater than that gained by courting black support.127  Still, a struc-
tural rule systematically barring black participation in party primaries
should not have been necessary to block this occurrence.  A white fac-
tion inclined to seek black support because of shared policy goals
would ostensibly decline to do so where such appeals would prompt
white defections of sufficient scope to cause electoral defeat.
If, however, the franchise is understood not only as a vehicle to
implement policy preferences, but also as a means to experience full
citizenship within the polity, the breadth of white support for the
white primary finds more ready explanation.  While some white
Democrats shared the same (or portions of the same) political agenda
as the black community, they remained overwhelmingly unwilling to
accept the consequences of full black political participation.  The
specter of black empowerment produced by meaningful black partici-
pation overshadowed the tangible gains that favored policies would
yield.  White Democrats accordingly supported the white primary even
when it appeared to harm their own immediate interests.
125
See supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text (discussing the pervasive disen-
franchisement of blacks in the South and the role the white primary played in sustain-
ing it).
126
See V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 621 (1949) (noting
how a Democratic faction that did not benefit from black support agitated for a white
primary law).
127
See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 11, at 663 (recounting Populist appeals to
black voters); see also KEY, supra note 56, at 262-63 (discussing how opponents of
agrarianism fomented the fear that “white disunity might restore carpetbagger or Ne-
gro government”); Goodwyn, supra note 53, at 1454 (providing text of September 1900
warning notice by East Texas White Man’s Union to those who would “perpetuate
[N]egro rule” (citation omitted)).
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B.  Transcending Race and the Fifteenth Amendment
Smith and Terry held that the right to vote encompasses the right to
participate in a determinative party primary free from racial discrimina-
tion.  The African American voters excluded from the white primaries
were registered Democrats and were, but for their race, eligible to par-
ticipate in the primaries.  The Court accordingly did not confront the
permissibility of primary exclusions based on factors other than race,
such as gender, religion, or partisan affiliation.  This Part argues that the
decisions nevertheless posit a conception of political participation under
which exclusions based on such criteria become suspect as well.128  Smith
and Terry recognized that access to a competitive election is an essential
component of the right to vote and that a determinative party primary
constitutes state action, implicating that right.  State officials may not
deny the right to vote in a general election based on gender, religion, or
partisan affiliation.  A determinative party primary is the functional
equivalent of a general election and as a result its electorate must be as
inclusive as the general election electorate.
Of course, the Court that decided Smith and Terry would not have
agreed.  At the time, the Justices had not yet expressly recognized the
Fourteenth Amendment to protect the quintessentially “political”
right to vote.129  What is more, between Smith and Terry, the Court de-
128
See, e.g., Persily, Functional Defense, supra note 6, at 758 (suggesting that the White
Primary Cases may be read to establish that “parties’ state actor status even outside the
context of race discrimination remains intact . . . . Thus, the Constitution . . . requires
that primaries pass all the tests of nondiscrimination applicable to other forms of state
action”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 64 (1987)
(suggesting that strict scrutiny should apply to a state open primary law).
129
See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  CREATION AND RECON-
STRUCTION 216, 217 & n.*, 218 (1998) (“Reconstructors in 1866 declared that Section
1 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] focused on ‘civil rights,’ not ‘political rights’ like
voting and military service.”); HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM W. WIECEK, EQUAL
JUSTICE UNDER LAW:  CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 395-97 (1982)
(distinguishing among civil, political, and social rights); EARL MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS 1863-1869, at 118-20 (1990) (arguing that the
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend for it to federalize power over
suffrage); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Back to the Future?  How the Bill of Rights Might Be About
Structure After All, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 977, 993 (1999) (reviewing and citing AMAR, supra)
(“[Its] framers . . . argued repeatedly that section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
would not protect political rights such as the right to vote.”); Reva Siegel, Why Equal
Protection No Longer Protects:  The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 1111, 1120 (1997) (“Distinctions among civil, political, and social rights func-
tioned more as a framework for debate than a conceptual scheme of any legal preci-
sion.”); PRIMUS, supra note 119, at 153-174 (describing the fluidity with which the
terms civil, political and social rights were used during Reconstruction).  But cf. Katz,
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cided Colegrove v. Green,130 which deemed nonjusticiable a challenge to
unequal apportionment of voting populations and thereby suggested
that the right to vote falls outside the Fourteenth Amendment’s ambit.
That suggestion is significant because it implies that nonracial exclu-
sions from a determinative party primary are of no constitutional con-
cern.  The right to vote may require access to such a primary, but ab-
sent Fourteenth Amendment protection for that right, the Fifteenth
Amendment is the only applicable constitutional provision and it re-
quires nothing more than racially inclusive participatory rules.
To be sure, race-based exclusions from a determinative primary
likely contravene the Equal Protection Clause even if the right to vote
is not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Assuming state ac-
tion may be found absent a claimed interference with the right to
vote,131 enforcing a race-based exclusion from a determinative party
primary undoubtedly constitutes invidious discrimination lacking any
cognizable justification, regardless of whether anyone has been de-
nied the right to vote.  By contrast, circumscribing a primary elector-
ate based on nonracial criteria such as partisan affiliation seems per-
fectly reasonable.  Such an exclusion would be a reasonable
regulation furthering the institutional roles of political parties.132
Within this doctrinal framework, Smith and Terry radiate no further
than the Fifteenth Amendment’s specific context of race and the vote.
They have no direct bearing on the validity of ideologically based ex-
clusions from a determinative party primary.
Nine years after Terry, however, the Court overcame its aversion to
the “political thicket,”133 and recognized its authority to adjudicate ap-
portionment questions.134  Shortly thereafter, it relied on the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to establish the one per-
son, one vote principle.135  By 1970, the Court had recognized voting as a
supra note 121, at 2390-93 (arguing that Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884), sug-
gests the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to vote).
130
328 U.S. 549 (1946) (plurality opinion).
131
For example, insofar as the fact of regulation, independent of its relationship
to the right to vote, was the key to the state action determination in Smith, the white
primary there implicated Fourteenth Amendment concerns.  Cf. supra notes 82-84 and
accompanying text.
132
See infra note 172 (discussing this institutional role).
133
Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556.
134
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226-37 (1962) (holding reapportionment chal-
lenges to be justiciable).
135
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).  Scholars consider Baker and the
subsequent reapportionment decisions among the most significant decisions of the
twentieth century.  See, e.g., ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 22, at 161 (“Baker was per-
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fundamental right protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.136  It
began subjecting regulations that narrow the electorate for the general
election to the most rigorous judicial scrutiny,137 and struck down efforts
to limit the franchise based on ideological commitments or depth of os-
tensible interest in the election.138
Carrington v. Rash,139 for example, invalidated a Texas law that barred
military personnel from participating in local elections.  The State de-
fended the exclusion, in part, on the ground that it was necessary to pro-
tect the distinct interests of the civilian community, interests the State
asserted military voters would not share.  The Court rejected this inter-
est, holding that “‘fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the popu-
lation because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissi-
ble.”140  The right to vote “cannot constitutionally be obliterated because
of a fear of the political views of a particular group of bona fide resi-
dents.”141  Similarly, Dunn v. Blumstein142 struck down Tennessee’s dura-
tional residency requirement which the State claimed helped assure vot-
ers shared a “common interest” in local governance.143  Dunn states that
haps the most profoundly destabilizing opinion in the Supreme Court’s history.”).  But
see ELLIOTT, supra note 56, at 72 (arguing that the White Primary Cases “probably worked
a greater overall change in the political structure of the states affected than [did] re-
apportionment”).
136
E.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626-28 (1969) (ap-
plying strict scrutiny to a law denying some district residents the right to vote in school
board elections).
137
See id. at 632 (applying close scrutiny); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95
(1965) (same).
138
See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 357-58 (1972) (“[D]urational resi-
dence requirements . . . founder because of their crudeness as a device for achieving
the articulated state goal of assuring the knowledgeable exercise of the franchise.”);
Kramer, 395 U.S. at 632 (concluding that the restriction did not achieve, “with suffi-
cient precision,” the aim of defining an informed electorate); Carrington, 380 U.S. at
95-97 (invalidating a Texas law that denied military personnel the vote in local elec-
tions).  Exceptions have emerged with time, of course.  See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S.
355, 370 (1981) (upholding restrictions on the electorate for a water district because
the district had only government “functions . . . of the narrow, special sort”); Holt v.
Civic Club of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1978) (permitting a municipality to deny
the right to vote to nonresidents subject to the municipality’s police jurisdiction);
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1973)
(upholding restriction limiting the franchise to landowners for a water district with
“relatively limited governmental authority”).
139
380 U.S. 89.
140
Id. at 94.
141
Id.
142
405 U.S. 330 (1972).
143
Id. at 345 (citation omitted).
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“‘[d]ifferences of opinion’ may not be the basis for excluding any group
or person from the franchise.”144
These doctrinal developments suggested that Smith and Terry’s con-
ception of meaningful political participation might find application even
in the absence of allegations of racial discrimination.  Smith and Terry
hold that the determinative election in a jurisdiction is necessarily in-
fused with state action and that the right to vote must encompass the
right to participate at this juncture.  Those administering such determi-
native elections must not only refrain from racial discrimination, but are
bound by all other constitutional constraints that limit state actors.145
And, as Carrington and Dunn attest, one of those constraints is the inabil-
ity to exclude voters from participating in an election because of their
political views.  The right to vote cannot be made to hinge on ideologi-
cal or political commitments.
A determinative party primary that excludes nonmembers, how-
ever, does precisely that.  It makes partisan affiliation a prerequisite to
participating in the jurisdiciton’s sole juncture of meaningful electoral
decision making.  Given that Smith and Terry recognize that the right
to vote encompasses the right to participate at this juncture, excluding
nonmembers from a determinative primary becomes no different
from limiting the general election to voters from one party.  Both
deny those excluded the right to vote.
A voter denied access to either election could simply join the
dominant party and thereby cast a ballot.  That fact, however, ought to
be of no consequence as a matter of doctrine.  State actors may con-
sider partisan affiliation when engaging in a host of regulatory activi-
ties, from the drawing of district lines to setting the requirements for
participation in party primaries.146  Once, however, that primary be-
144
Id. at 355 (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705-06 (1969)).
145
This assumes that the same standards define state action under the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments.  See James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 136-40 (1903) (dis-
cussing state action standard for Fourteenth Amendment and Fifteenth Amendment
interchangeably); Paul Carman, Comment, Cousins and La Follette:  An Anomaly Cre-
ated by a Choice Between Freedom of Association and the Right to Vote, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 666,
677-81 (1986) (suggesting that the same tests determine state action under the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments).  But see Kevin R. Puvalowski, Note, Immune from
Review?:  Threshold Issues in Section 1983 Challenges to the Delegate Selection Procedures of Na-
tional Political Parties, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 409, 417 n.70 (1993) (“The Court has never
ruled expressly whether the state action analysis is the same for the two Amend-
ments.”).
146
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1792 (2004) (plurality opinion) (deem-
ing partisan gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable); Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp.
837, 847 (D. Conn.), aff’d mem., 429 U.S. 989 (1976) (“[A] state legitimately may condi-
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comes the determinative election in a jurisdiction, partisan affiliation
should no longer dictate participatory rights.  Otherwise, the right to
vote becomes dependent on ideological commitments.
The Supreme Court, of course, has never embraced this view.  In-
deed, several decisions after 1970 celebrate the associational rights of po-
litical parties in a manner that suggests that the evolution of Fourteenth
Amendment doctrine did not extend Smith and Terry beyond the Fif-
teenth Amendment’s proscription against racial discrimination in vot-
ing.
Nader v. Schaffer,147 for example, permits a traditional state actor to
assist political parties in discriminating based on political affiliation
when deciding who gets to participate in party primaries.  Nader upholds
a state-mandated closed primary based, in part, on the paradoxical find-
ing that the protection of party autonomy justifies regulating party activ-
ity.  The state can block independent voters from participating in a party
primary “to protect the party ‘from intrusion by those with adverse po-
litical principles.’”148  Nader acknowledges that “constitutional standards
must be satisfied in primary . . . elections,” but insists that there is no
“right to vote in primary elections [when] the voter refuses to comply
with constitutionally legitimate rules and requirements of party mem-
bership.”149  The decision locates nothing to the contrary in Smith v. All-
wright, in which the petitioner “did not question the party membership
requirement, but successfully challenged as unconstitutional his exclu-
sion from Democratic Party membership on the basis of race.”150
In a similar vein, Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La-
Follette151 upheld party autonomy to adopt and enforce rules governing
national conventions that disregard state laws restricting the election of
convention delegates.  In language that the Court has invoked repeat-
edly,152 LaFollette asserted that free association to advance political beliefs
tion one’s participation in a party’s nominating process on some showing of loyalty to
that party.”).
147
417 F. Supp. 837, 850 (D. Conn.), aff’d mem., 429 U.S. 989 (1976).
148
Id. at 845 (quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 154, 221-22 (1952)).
149
Id. at 842 n.4.
150
Id.; see also Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 232 (1989)
(holding that state-mandated restrictions on the organization of party governing bodies
interfere with the right of political parties to free association, and rejecting arguments
seeking to justify the state regulations by citing Smith and stating, “[t]his . . is not a case
where intervention is necessary to prevent the derogation of the civil rights of party adher-
ents”).
151
450 U.S. 107 (1981).
152
For examples of this, see California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574
(2000); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986).
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“necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify the people who consti-
tute the association, and to limit the association to those people only.”153
Ideological discrimination thereby emerges not as unconstitutional con-
duct but instead as the exercise of a constitutionally protected right.  In
this context, Smith and Terry apparently pose no obstacle, and indeed did
not even earn a citation in the majority opinion.154
In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,155 a concern for party
autonomy prompted the Court to invalidate a state statute that blocked
the Republican Party from including independent voters in its party
primary.156  LaFollette had already deemed free association to require
party freedom to define membership qualifications.  Tashjian followed
suit by deeming the party’s attempt “to broaden public participation in
and support for its activities [as] conduct undeniably central to the exer-
cise of the right of association.”157  By blocking the party from inviting a
group of voters to participate in the “‘basic function’ of selecting the
Party’s candidates,” the state statute “limit[ed] the Party’s associational
opportunities at the crucial juncture at which the appeal to common
principles may be translated into concerted action, and hence to politi-
cal power in the community.”158
Tashjian did not explicitly reconcile its holding with Smith and Terry
but nevertheless suggested that the earlier cases involved distinct con-
cerns.  Tashjian asserted that the Constitution’s grant of state power to
regulate congressional elections “does not justify, without more, the
abridgment of fundamental rights, such as the right to vote . . . or, as
here, the freedom of political association.”159  The Court thus deemed
153
LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 122.
154
Cf. id. at 134 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting) (suggesting that nonideological character
of the major political parties explains why Smith and Terry impose “constitutional limita-
tions on party activities”).
155
479 U.S. 208 (1986).
156
See id. at 225 (holding that a state mandated closed primary burdened the asso-
ciational rights of a party desiring to include independent voters in its primary).
157
Id. at 214 (“[T]he freedom to join together in furtherance of common political
beliefs ‘necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify the people who constitute the as-
sociation.’” (quoting LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 122)).
158
Id. at 215-16 (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58 (1973)).
159
479 U.S. at 217 (citation omitted); see also U.S. CONST. Art. I., § 4, cl. 1 (grant-
ing the states broad power to prescribe the “Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives”).
Tashjian also rejected as inapposite the argument that the statute only minimally bur-
dened the associational right because nonmembers could participate in the party primary
by joining the party.  Tashjian deemed the “public act of affiliation” that such participation
would require suspect under free expression cases such as Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,
714-15 (1977), and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-634
356 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 325
the State’s effort to restrict primary participation based on ideological
criteria an interference with freedom of political association, but not,
apparently, with the right to vote.160  Smith and Terry, of course, based
their Fifteenth Amendment holdings on the conclusion that race-based
exclusions from the primaries at issue denied the right to vote to those
excluded.  Tashjian posited that seemingly similar ideological discrimi-
nation does not, but failed to explain why.
Like Tashjian, California Democratic Party v. Jones maintained that a
partisan primary does not infringe on an individual’s “fundamental”
right to vote as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.161  In striking
down California’s blanket primary as an interference with the associa-
tional rights of political parties,162 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion ex-
plained that Smith and Terry do not block political parties from exclud-
ing nonmembers from party primaries, but instead “simply prevent
exclusion that violates some independent constitutional proscription.”163
The decision found that excluding nonmembers from participating in a
party primary violates no such proscription.  More specifically, Jones ex-
pressly denied that “the ‘fundamental right’ to cast a meaningful vote
[is] really at issue in this context.”164  Were it implicated “in this context,”
Justice Scalia wrote, the state law authorizing the blanket primary “would
be not only constitutionally permissible but constitutionally required.”165
(1943).  Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 216 n.7.  Insofar as voting in a party primary implicates the
right to vote, however, mandating party affiliation as prerequisite to primary voting argua-
bly also runs afoul of precedent such as Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), which bars
states from limiting the electorate to like-minded voters.  Tashjian,  only identified tensions
with the free expression cases.  Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 216 n.7.  This reasoning does not deny
that voting in a party primary implicates the right to vote, but, by identifying tension only
with the free expression cases, nevertheless implies that the invalidated statute did not so
interfere.
160
For this reason, Nader v. Schaffer survives Tashjian.  An independent voter has
no constitutionally protected right to participate in a party primary, while the party has
a protected associational interest in inviting independents to participate, an interest
that renders a contrary state law unconstitutional.
161
530 U.S. 567 (2000); see also infra note 175 and accompanying text.
162
Like an open primary, a blanket primary permits primary voters to select can-
didates from any party, but, unlike an open primary, lets them make this selection for
each office on the ballot. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2001 (West Supp. 2000) (“All persons
entitled to vote, including those not affiliated with any political party, shall have the
right to vote . . . for any candidate regardless of the candidate’s political affiliation.”),
quoted in Jones, 530 U.S. at 570.  Thus, in a statewide primary, a blanket primary allows a
voter to select a Democratic candidate for governor, a Republican for attorney general,
and a Libertarian for secretary of state.
163
Jones, 530 U.S. at 573 n.5.
164
Id.
165
Id.
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Not so, of course, under the reading of Smith and Terry set forth in
this Article.  Under these decisions, the fundamental right to cast a
meaningful ballot encompasses the right to participate in a competitive
electoral process.  This right, however, does not always necessitate non-
member access to a partisan primary.  Only when a district is noncom-
petitive does the right to meaningful political participation trump a
party’s claim to free political association.  Indeed, a political party unwill-
ing to bear the associational burden that follows from such compulsory
access need only forgo its politically safe districts to restore its associa-
tional autonomy to exclude nonmembers.166  In other words, closed
primaries in competitive districts do not infringe the right to vote.167
Jones, however, rejected this understanding of political participation,
and instead reads Smith and Terry as applying only to race-based exclu-
sions from primary elections.  Jones stated:
These cases held only that, when a State prescribes an election proc-
ess that gives a special role to political parties, it “endorses, adopts, and
enforces the discrimination against Negroes” that the parties (or, in the
case of the Jaybird Democratic Association, organizations that are “part
and parcel” of the parties) bring into the process—so that the parties’
discriminatory action becomes state action under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment.
168
The Fifteenth Amendment accordingly provides the “independent
constitutional proscription” violated by the exclusions at issue in Smith
and Terry, with the race-based exclusion constituting the essential ele-
ment of the constitutional injury identified.  In short, the Court suggests
that racially exclusive party primaries implicate the right to vote while
ideologically exclusive ones do not.
As argued above,169 however, the white primaries at issue in Smith
and Terry both became state action and infringed the right to vote not
simply because they involved racial discrimination, but because they en-
forced such discrimination at the sole competitive juncture in the elec-
toral process.  The absence of subsequent electoral competition is a
166
In this way, the conception of political participation underlying Smith and Terry
might help curb the excesses of partisan gerrymandering and reduce the number of
noncompetitive districts such gerrymandering produces.  Cf. infra text following note
301.
167
See supra note 113 and accompanying text (arguing that Smith and Terry do not
render all primaries subject to constitutional constraints).
168
530 U.S. at 573 (quoting Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 482 (Clark, J., concur-
ring) (1953)).
169
See supra note 113 and accompanying text (arguing that primaries become state
action when subsequent elections are noncompetitive).
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critical component of the holdings.  It rendered the white primaries the
only point in time where meaningful political participation could occur
and, for this reason, rendered them state action infringing the right to
vote.  The later emergence of voting as a fundamental right protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment suggests an analogous right to participate
in a jurisdiction’s sole competitive election regardless of one’s race or
ideological convictions.170
Decisions like Nader, LaFollette, and Tashjian do not foreclose this
understanding.  To be sure, they celebrate associational freedom and
the ideological discrimination its enjoyment entails, and, in the process,
intimate that a racially inclusive party primary does not implicate the
right to vote.  Yet these decisions do not address partisan primaries that
function as “the only effective part of the elective process,”171 and do not
suggest that their analysis necessarily applies where a party primary is the
determinative election.  Indeed, the district court in Nader qualified its
holding sustaining a state-mandated closed primary by expressly noting
that the primary at issue did not operate in “a ‘one-party’ state—and
thus no one party’s primary election [was] completely determinative
of the outcome.”172  Likewise, the district court in Tashjian emphasized
that when the Court decided the White Primary Cases, Texas was a one-
party state and winning the Democratic primary “was tantamount to
election to public office.”  No one “could . . . seriously contend that anything
resembling that situation is true of Connecticut at this time.”173
Like Nader and Tashjian, California Democratic Party v. Jones did not
confront a wholly noncompetitive electoral system.  While “safe” districts
certainly exist in California, numerous local and statewide elections in-
170
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
171
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953).
172
Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 843 (D. Conn. 1976).  State action was, of
course, present in Nader, even though the general election was competitive.  State law,
as opposed to party policy, mandated the exclusion of independent voters from party
primaries.  The Court nevertheless permits the state to discriminate among voters
based on partisan affiliation and ideological commitment.  The presence of electoral
competition supports this holding.  In a competitive electoral arena, political parties
need to enforce the boundaries of membership for party adherents to come together
and form opinions, and to allow the party to perform its institutional role within the
electoral arena.  The state law in Nader reinforced this institutional role.  Absent com-
petition, however, a determinative primary performs a wholly different function, such
that state efforts to exclude voters from this critical juncture undermine, rather than
support, the institutional role the primary performs.
173
Republican Party v. Tashjian, 599 F. Supp. 1228, 1233 (D. Conn. 1984).
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volve competitive races among candidates from various parties.174  Justice
Scalia’s insistence, moreover, that the “fundamental right to vote [is not]
really at issue in this context” rests, at least in part, on his observation
that “[s]electing a candidate is quite different from voting for the candi-
date of one’s choice.”175  The opinion thus implies that distinct concerns
arise when these two acts cannot be distinguished.  And in a determina-
tive party primary, they cannot.  Where a competitive primary is followed
by a noncompetitive general election, selecting the party’s candidate
represents the only meaningful juncture to vote for the candidate of
one’s choice.
Jones nevertheless denied expressly that the decisiveness of a pri-
mary election alters the constitutional analysis.  Defenders of the
blanket primary argued that the practice was needed to prevent the
disenfranchisement of independent and minority-party voters in dis-
tricts where the majority party’s primary was the determinative elec-
tion.  Justice Scalia’s opinion, however, flatly rejected the notion that
“nonparty members’ keen desire to participate in selection of the
party’s nominee . . . [constitutes] ‘disenfranchisement’ if that desire is
not fulfilled.”176
The decision thereby replaced the vibrant conception of the right
to vote underlying Smith and Terry with a more narrow understanding.
The white primaries sought to block African American voters from
engaging politically with their fellow citizens, being courted as the
coveted swing voters in a tight election, and influencing electoral out-
comes.177  The right to vote must encompass the opportunity to be the
swing voter, Smith and Terry reasoned, and accordingly both decisions
found state action and a consequent constitutional violation.  Jones
disagreed, and, erasing the core rationale for Smith and Terry, identi-
174
See generally California Election Results, at http://vote96.ss.ca.gov/Vote96/
html/vote/vote.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2004) (showing participation in statehouse
races by Libertarian and Natural Law Party candidates); cf. John Harwood, No Contests:
House Incumbents Tap Census, Software to Get a Lock on Seats, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2002,
at A1 (noting expectation that redistricting would produce no competitive congres-
sional elections among California’s fifty-three member congressional delegation).
175
Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 573 n.5 (2000) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
176
Id. at 583.  Jones concludes that the blanket primary was unnecessary even if the
Court deemed non-party-members disenfranchised in “safe” districts, given that such
voters “should simply join the party.”  Id. at 584.  Distinguishing Tashjian’s concern
that this “public act of affiliation” raised First Amendment concerns, see supra note 159,
Jones states that joining the party may present “a hard choice, but it is not a state-
imposed restriction” on freedom of association.  Jones, 530 U.S. at 584.
177
See supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
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fied no right to participate in a determinative partisan primary so long
as it is racially inclusive.  Ultimately, the associational interests of po-
litical parties emerge as the sole constitutional interest at stake.  Non-
party members excluded from such primaries suffer no constitutional
injury.  In short, Smith and Terry remain good law, but only as applied
to race-based exclusions.
Narrowing Smith and Terry in this manner is doctrinally puzzling,
particularly given Jones’s insistence that a partisan primary does not im-
plicate the “‘fundamental right’ to cast a meaningful vote.”178  After all, a
violation of the Fifteenth Amendment requires not only race-based dis-
crimination, but also interference with the right to vote.179  But if a race-
based exclusion from a determinative (or, indeed, nondeterminative)
partisan primary implicates the right to vote, an ideologically based one
ought to as well, given the protection the Fourteenth Amendment now
accords to the right to vote.
Yet Jones’s sense that racial discrimination differs from other types of
discrimination is hardly unprecedented.  In several cases, the Court has
identified both state action and constitutional infringements when it
confronted instances of racial discrimination, but it has declined to find
either when faced with other types of discrimination in seemingly analo-
gous circumstances.180
178
Jones, 530 U.S. at 574 n.5.
179
See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”).
180
See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S.Ct. 1769, 1781, 1792 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(rejecting claim that partisan and racial gerrymanders should be subject to the same
judicial scrutiny and holding partisan gerrymandering claims to be nonjusticiable); id.
at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (refusing to hold partisan gerrymandering claims
nonjusticiable but agreeing that race and politics were so distinct that the racial gerry-
mandering cases had no application); see also LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 22, at
459 (discussing Republican Party of Texas v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. 1997), and sug-
gesting that state action might be more readily found if a state party were to refuse to
lease a booth at a party convention to a particular racial group than to a group sup-
porting policies favorable to gays and lesbians); Cain, supra note 48, at 802 (arguing
that states may infringe on party autonomy only “to prevent racial discrimination and
maintain the orderly management of the ballot”); Neal Troum, Expressive Association
and the Right to Exclude:  Reading Between the Lines in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 35
CREIGHTON L. REV. 641, 684 (2002) (“If James Dale had been excluded because he was
black, it is less clear that BSA would have won its expressive association claim.”);
J. Craig Buchan, Note, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale:  The Scout Oath and Law Survive
Government Intrusion, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 153, 171 (2002) (“[T]he Court [in Dale] . . . did
provide a clear distinction between discrimination based on sexual preference and that
based on race, gender, national origin, or ethnicity in quasi-private organizations.”).
Compare Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (locating state action in judicial en-
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Similarly, Rice v. Cayetano181 held that defining an electorate based on
race infringes the fundamental right to vote even though, absent the ra-
cial classification, that right would not be at issue.  Rice struck down as a
violation of the Fifteenth Amendment a state law providing that only
“Hawaiians” could vote for the trustees of Hawaii’s Office of Hawaiian
Affairs (OHA), a public agency that oversees programs designed to
benefit the state’s native people.182  In defending the electoral restric-
tion, Hawaii had argued, inter alia, that the OHA’s limited powers ren-
dered it a “special purpose” district and thus one for which an electorate
limited to those deemed most affected by district governance is permis-
sible.183  The Court has reasoned that such districts do not exercise gen-
eral governmental powers and, as a result, that their restrictive voting re-
gimes do not implicate the fundamental right to vote.184  Rice, however,
surprisingly accepted the proposition that the OHA might constitute a
special purpose district,185 but nevertheless held that its voting regime
infringed upon the right to vote as protected by the Fifteenth Amend-
ment.
The reason, Rice stated, was that the OHA’s electoral restriction em-
bodied a racial classification.  Rice held that, while a special purpose dis-
trict that restricts the electorate to property owners does not implicate
the right to vote, a similarly empowered district that classifies voters by
race does implicate this right.  Property owners who select the board of
directors for a water management district are engaged in an administra-
forcement of racially restrictive covenant), with Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp.,
530 F.2d 66, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding no state action where plaintiffs alleged sex-
based denial of right to assign according to facially neutral contract).
181
528 U.S. 495 (2000).
182
The state laws at issue distinguish among Hawaiians, who include any descen-
dant of a person living on the Hawaiian Islands in 1778; Native Hawaiians, who include
any descendent of not less than one-half part of the blood of the races inhabiting the
Hawaiian Islands before 1778; and implicitly, all other citizens of Hawaii.  See HAW.
CONST., art. XII, § 5 (establishing board of trustees to be “elected by qualified voters
who are Hawaiians”); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 513 (2000) (“The Fifteenth
Amendment was quite sufficient to invalidate a scheme which did not mention race
but instead used ancestry in an attempt to confine and restrict the voting franchise.”).
183
See Brief for Respondent at 41-45, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (1999) (No.
98-818) (arguing that the OHA’s limited powers rendered it analagous to a special
purpose district).
184
See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 371 (1981) (applying deferential rational
basis review to voting regime restricting vote to property owners); Salyer Land Co. v.
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 729 (1973) (same).
185
See Rice, 528 U.S. at 522 (“The question before us is not the one-person, one-
vote requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the race neutrality command of
the Fifteenth Amendment.”).
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tive act subject only to the most deferential judicial review, but the “Ha-
waiian” voters electing OHA trustees exercise a fundamental right, re-
strictions on which are subject to the most exacting review.  The expla-
nation is not that the OHA enjoys powers that may be distinguished
doctrinally from those possessed by a water district, but instead that the
State’s use of a race-based classification to define its electorate trans-
formed an administrative electoral system into a highly significant one
implicating the fundamental right to vote.  That is, the use of a racial
classification to define an electorate elevates the act of participation in
an election from an administrative act into one implicating constitu-
tional concerns.186
A similar conception of the transformative power of racial classifica-
tions may explain the Court’s effort to distinguish a racially exclusive
primary from a partisan one.  Decisions like Jones view a racially inclusive
partisan primary as a largely private forum in which political parties ex-
ercise their associational rights.  The existence of racial discrimination,
however, suffices to transform such primaries into highly significant
electoral systems implicating the fundamental right to vote.  In this
realm, the associational claims of political parties must yield to vindicate
the voting rights of those excluded.
Jones, accordingly, maintained that Smith and Terry remain good
law, but law addressing the distinct problem of racial discrimination.
The race-based exclusion creating the white primary became the es-
sential component of Smith’s and Terry’s holdings.  The result, how-
ever, is a substantial revision of the decisions’ scope and import.  The
white primary was designed to deny black voters the opportunity to in-
fluence electoral outcomes and thereby to block them from enjoying
the benefits of citizenship that follow from meaningful political par-
ticipation.  Yet the existence of racial discrimination does not suffice
to transform any electoral system into state action implicating the
right to vote.187  Rather, the white primaries at issue in Smith and Terry
186
See Katz, supra note 123, at 521 (arguing that Rice v. Cayetano similarly conceives
of race such that “[w]hat previously might have been perceived of as a process ill-suited
to the formation of the ‘self-constitutive values of citizenship’ now becomes a forum
self-consciously designed and understood to promote a very specific type of self and
community identity” (quoting Frank Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American
Constitutional Argument:  Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 469 (1989))).
187
Indeed, Smith and Terry may be read to permit at least some race-based exclu-
sions from party primaries, even those subject to state regulation.  For example, Smith
and Terry need not require that a white supremacist party always allow black voters to
participate in its primary or that a black nationalist party should necessarily be re-
quired to include white participants.  Instead, the decisions require racially inclusive
rules for participation in party primaries only when such primaries function as the sole
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violated the Fifteenth Amendment because they operated as the de-
terminative elections in their respective jurisdictions.
II.  CONTROLLING THE RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE PRIMARY
ELECTORATE
Legislators, judges, and scholars have long debated how the racial
composition of an electoral district shapes the political influence that
racial minorities wield.  In noncompetitive districts, however, minority
influence depends more specifically on the racial composition of the
electorate for the majority party’s primary.188  That electorate may, but
need not, mirror the demographic composition of the district as
whole.  Just as a district boundary may constitute a racial gerrymander
or give rise to racial vote dilution, a determinative primary may be
structured so as to give rise to analogous harms.  As a result, the same
complex web of federal statutory and constitutional rules governing
the racial composition of electoral districts should govern primary
structures as well.
An additional rule, however, applies in the primary context,
namely the associational right defined by decisions such as Jones.  This
Part explains how a political party may invoke this right to manipulate
the racial composition of its primary electorate.  Because African
American voters are among the most loyal Democratic voters,189 this
locus of meaningful decision making within electoral system.  When competitive elec-
tions follow primaries, parties are free to impose discriminatory participatory rules.
188
See, e.g., Grofman et al., supra note 22, at 1409-1411 (discussing the importance
of primary elections in evaluating minority political power and noting that “the highest
percentage [of the] black [vote] needed to win is not always found in the general elec-
tion”); Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself?, supra note 22, at 1534 (noting
that in safe Democratic districts, “if black voters have effective control of the primary
election, those voters will determine who represents the district, even if black voters
are not a majority of the district overall”).
189
See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 245 (2000) (stating that in North
Carolina African Americans “register and vote Democratic between 95% and 97% of
the time”); Maxine Burkett, Strategic Voting and African-Americans:  True Vote, True Repre-
sentation, True Power for the Black Community, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 425, 430 (2003) (dis-
cussing the “unwavering allegiance to the Democratic Party by the Black community
and leaders alike”); Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retro-
gression, 3 ELECTION L.J. 21, 25 n.38  (2004) [hereinafter Karlan, Retrogression of Retro-
gression] (“According to the state’s expert, ‘[u]pward of 90% of black voters support
Democrats, while over 60% of white voters cast their ballots for Republicans.’”).  But see
Lynette Clemetson, Younger Blacks Tell Democrats to Take Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2003,
at A1 (reporting increased tendency among African American voters aged eighteen to
thirty-five to affiliate as Independents rather than as Democrats); Juan Williams, Bush
Shouldn’t Write Off the Black Vote, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2004, at A21 (arguing that Presi-
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power devolves primarily to the Democratic Party.  As explained in
more detail below, Democrats may use this power for partisan advan-
tage either to generate a violation of federal voting rights law or to en-
sure the legality of their chosen primary structure.  This power further
erodes the White Primary Cases by restoring to a political party the
power to control the racial composition of its primary electorate for
partisan gain.
Part II.A explains how excluding nonmembers from a determina-
tive Democratic primary increases the proportion of the primary elec-
torate comprised by black voters and may produce a majority-minority
primary.  While Democrats today have little affection for the majority-
minority district given its linkage with Democratic electoral defeats,
the majority-minority primary offers a vehicle to maintain or enlarge
descriptive black representation without diminishing party influence.
This Part explains how the associational right recognized in Jones of-
fers the Democratic Party a mechanism to create such primaries with-
out generating the expressive harms that led to the invalidation of the
majority-minority districts in the racial gerrymandering cases.
Part II.B maintains that a determinative primary may dilute minor-
ity voting strength, and that a closed majority-minority primary may do
so by “packing” black voters into the primary electorate.  It argues that
excluding nonmembers from a determinative Democratic primary
may generate racial vote dilution in violation of the Voting Rights Act
(VRA),190 and that resolution of the resulting conflict between the
party’s associational right and federal voting rights law may require
redistricting to adjust the racial balance of the district, and by exten-
sion of the primary.  The associational interest defined in Jones may
accordingly enable the Democratic Party to destabilize an unfavorable
partisan gerrymander and “unpack” districts in which a Republican-
controlled legislature has concentrated minority voters.
Part II.C describes and evaluates a recent case that challenged the
operation of Georgia’s open primary in a safe Democratic district on
the ground that it caused racial vote dilution.
dent Bush could attract as much as 20% of the black vote in the 2004 presidential elec-
tion).
190 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2002)).
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A. The Majority-Minority Primary and Racial Gerrymandering
Numerous studies report that the creation of majority-minority
districts during the 1990s led to an overall decrease in the power of
the Democratic Party.191  As a result, the Democratic Party today will
disperse minority voters among several electoral districts if it has the
power to do so.192
The Court’s 2003 decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft193 approved this
practice.  It held that the VRA does not require that jurisdictions draw
majority-minority districts when a smaller population of black voters
can elect representatives of choice or otherwise influence the electoral
191
For a sampling of these studies, see DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REP-
RESENTATION 114 (1997) (estimating that majority-minority districts cost Democrats
eleven congressional seats they would have won absent such districts); Mark F. Bern-
stein, Racial Gerrymandering, PUB. INT., Winter 1996, at 59, 60-64 (discussing “Demo-
cratic decline following the creation of black-majority districts” and claiming that racial
gerrymandering “directly cost” the Democrats a dozen congressional seats); Charles
Cameron et al., Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in
Congress?, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 794, 810 (1996) (commenting that in Georgia the
congressional delegation changed from nine Democrats and one Republican to three
black Democrats and eight white Republicans in only two years); Bernard Grofman &
Lisa Handley, 1990s Issues in Voting Rights, 65 MISS. L.J. 205, 263-65 (1995) (estimating
that between two and eleven of the congressional seats lost by Democrats between 1990
and 1994 might have been kept absent the creation of minority-majority districts);
Kevin A. Hill, Does the Creation of Majority Black Districts Aid Republicans?  An Analysis of
the 1992 Congressional Elections in Eight Southern States, 57 J. POL. 384, 395 (1995) (ex-
plaining that a “change in the proportion of African Americans residing in a district is
a strong predictor of the vote in that district”); David Lublin, Racial Redistricting and
African-American Representation:  A Critique of “Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize
Substantive Black Representation in Congress?,” 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 183, 186 (1999)
(noting that the removal of African Americans from white districts creates a greater
likelihood that a Republican candidate will be elected); John J. Miller, Race to Defeat:
How the Black Caucus Elected Newt Gingrich Speaker, REASON, Feb. 1995, at 23 (stating that
the creation of thirteen new majority-black districts after the 1990 census “guaranteed
the election of black Democrats to the new seats, but it also ‘whitened’ neighboring
districts and made them more Republican”).  But see Richard L. Engstrom, Voting Rights
Districts:  Debunking the Myths, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, Apr. 1995, at 24 (arguing that
new black districts, particularly in the South, have not benefited the Republican Party);
Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption:  Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 291, 302-07 (1997) [hereinafter Karlan, Loss and Redemption] (arguing that redis-
tricting practices in the 1990s do not wholly explain southern Democratic losses).
192
See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2003) (discussing effort by
Georgia Democrats to “unpack” majority-African-American districts and disperse black
influence); see also Melissa L. Saunders, A Cautionary Tale:  Hunt v. Cromartie and the
Next Generation of Shaw Litigation, 1 ELECTION L.J. 173, 193 (2002) (anticipating that
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999), would spur Democrats to “unpack” former ma-
jority-minority districts); Jason Zengerle, Color Line:  Whitening Black Districts, NEW REPUBLIC,
Aug. 2001, at 12 (describing the “unpacking” efforts in North Carolina).
193
539 U.S. 461, 123 S. Ct. 2498 (2003).
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process.194  At issue in the case was whether Georgia could permissibly
replace some majority-minority districts with so-called “coalition” and
“influence” districts.195  In coalition districts, black voters need not
comprise the majority of a district’s population to be able to elect rep-
resentatives of choice,196 while influence districts permit minority vot-
ers to exert some sway in the electoral process, but not necessarily to
elect representatives of their choice.  All nine Justices agreed that a
coalition district was a viable substitute for a majority-minority dis-
trict,197 and a majority thought that an influence district could likewise
adequately preserve minority voting strength.198
Commentators have viewed Ashcroft as a victory for the Democratic
Party.199  It eliminates the perception that the VRA requires jurisdic-
194
The Court cited Pildes with approval in ruling that section 5 of the VRA “leaves
room for States to use . . . influence and coalitional districts” of the described type.  Id.
at 2513; see also Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War With Itself?, supra note 22, at 1522
(defining coalition districts as districts “with a significant population and [with] white
voters who are willing to form interracial political coalitions in support of minority
candidates”).
195
See Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2511-13 (describing district forms).  As a “covered” ju-
risdiction under the VRA, Georgia must demonstrate to the Attorney General or the
District Court for the District of Columbia that changes to its electoral system are dis-
criminatory in neither purpose nor effect.  This inquiry turns on whether the changes
“would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their
effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”  Id. at 477-80 (quoting Beer v. United
States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)).
196
See Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War With Itself?, supra note 22, at 1522
(explaining that in coalition districts, white voters “form interracial coalitions in sup-
port of minority candidates”); see also Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2511-12 (discussing coali-
tion districts); Page v. Bartels, 144 F. Supp. 2d 346, 354 (D.N.J. 2001) (accepting the
argument that certain majority-minority districts “wasted” African American votes be-
cause black-preferred candidates “would have been elected in any event with a much
diminished minority population”); Grofman et al., supra note 22, at 265 (noting that
districts with black voting age populations of thirty-five to forty percent suffice to give
minority voters an equal opportunity to elect candidates of choice).
197
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2511-12.  The dissent agreed with the majority that:
The prudential objective of § 5 is hardly betrayed if a State can show that a
new districting plan shifts from supermajority districts, in which minorities
can elect their candidates of choice by their own voting power, to coalition
districts, in which minorities are in fact shown to have a similar opportunity
when joined by predictably supportive nonminority voters.
Id. at 2517 (Souter, J., dissenting).
198
Id. at 2512-13 (2003).  The dissenters feared that influence districts were ill-
defined, offered minority voters insufficient avenues for political participation, and
that the majority’s reliance on such districts will provide “greater opportunity to re-
duce minority voting strength in the guise of obtaining party advantage.”  Id.
199
See, e.g., LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 22, at 33 (suggesting that the deci-
sion might benefit the Democratic party “who can spread more reliably Democratic
voters across a larger number of districts”); Adam Clymer, Court Allows New Approach to
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tions to create majority-minority districts whenever possible within
constitutional constraints, and enables Democratic legislators to
spread the party’s most reliable voters among several districts instead
of concentrating black voters within a single majority-black district.200
Dispersing black voters in this manner tends to place more Demo-
crats in office.  Their greater number yields official policy that is gen-
erally thought to be more responsive to black interests than that pro-
duced by a legislature comprised of districts in which black voters are
more concentrated and more Republicans are elected.201  The Demo-
crats elected, however, are more likely to be white,202 and thus maxi-
Redrawing Districts by Race, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at A20 (characterizing Ashcroft as
“endors[ing] a tactic Democrats employed in several states”); Rhonda Cook, Court:
Georgia Can Spread Out Minority Voters, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 27, 2003, at A8 (quot-
ing election law practitioner Sam Hirsch as viewing Ashcroft in the Democrat’s favor);
Jonathan Ringel, High Court Revives Democrats’ Redistricting Plan, FULTON COUNTY DAILY
REP., June 27, 2003, at 1 (describing Ashcroft as “a major victory for Georgia Demo-
crats”).
200
LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 22, at 33; see also Bernstein, supra note 191, at
64 (“Clearly, drawing the most loyal part of the Democratic constituency out of a dis-
trict will make it harder for the Democrats to hold the district.”).
201
See, e.g., LUBLIN, supra note 191, at 99 (“Black majority districts usually conflict
with efforts to maximize African-American substantive representation.  Doing the ut-
most to advance black interests necessitates destroying most black majority districts.”);
CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS:  THE REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN
AMERICANS IN CONGRESS 19 (1993) (stating that “Republicans are less responsive to
black interests than are Democrats”); Bernstein, supra note 191, at 68 (suggesting that
black interests were not better represented when Congress fell under Republican con-
trol, even though black participation in Congress was “at an all-time high”); Abigail
Thernstrom, More Notes from a Political Thicket, 44 EMORY L.J. 911, 939 (1995) (blasting
racial gerrymandering as promoting the idea that blacks are a “nation within our na-
tion”); Adam Cohen, Why Republicans Are Shamelessly in Love with the Voting Rights Act,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2002, § 4, at 14 (describing Georgia Republican outcry in favor of
black voting rights as possessing a “special cravenness”); Miller, supra note 191, at 23
(arguing that the election of black representatives from majority black districts pro-
duced Republican control of Congress and harmed interests supported by African
American voters); Carol M. Swain, The Future of Black Representation, AM. PROSPECT, Fall
1995, at 78, 80 (“African Americans lost substantive representation in 1994:  The new
Republican Congress represents their interests less than the previous Democratic one
even though the new Congress has more black members.”); see also Richard H. Pildes,
Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2531 (1997)
(“[D]escriptive representation might in theory enhance the likelihood of substantive
representation, [but] as a practical matter . . . more proportional descriptive represen-
tation might be achievable only at the weighty cost of declining substantive representa-
tion.”).
202
See LUBLIN, supra note 191, at 99 (“Maximizing black substantive representation
exacts a heavy price in terms of descriptive representation.”).
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mizing Democratic success tends to diminish so-called descriptive
black representation.203
That decline is cause for concern to both the African American
community and the Democratic Party.  Black candidates and legisla-
tors may be essential to energize black voters and ensure that they
turn out on election day.204  As important, a black presence in the leg-
islature, and not simply a Democratic one, may be necessary to pro-
duce policies favorable to black interests and hence to maintain black
support for the Democratic Party.205  Professor Karlan has described
the leverage that even a small number of black elected officials may
wield in a legislature that is closely divided between Democrats and
Republicans.  Such a divide means that white Democrats need the
support of black Democrats to implement any partisan policy initiative
and black Democrats can condition their cooperation on party sup-
port for policies that black voters tend to favor.206
Democratic electoral success, however, need not hinge on a re-
duction in descriptive black representation.  The coalition districts
upheld in Ashcroft allow black voters to elect black candidates to office
even when these voters do not comprise a majority of the population.
Black electoral success here depends on the increased willingness of
203
See id.
204
See, e.g., KATHERINE TATE, FROM PROTEST TO POLITICS:  THE NEW BLACK
VOTERS IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 81 (1993) (“Black officeseeking, particularly in elec-
tions involving Blacks as political newcomers, seems to be associated with astoundingly
high Black turnouts.”); Kathryn Abrams, “Raising Politics Up”:  Minority Political Partici-
pation and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 501 (1988) (arguing
that minority office holders are necessary for “political morale” and minority
empowerment); cf. LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY:  FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 85 (1994) (noting that a black candidate
seeking to displace a white officeholder may energize black voters, but that this sup-
port tends to dissipate after the election and rarely exists in reelection campaigns);
Grofman & Handley, supra note 191, at 268-69  (“The ‘blackening’ of the Democratic
party in the South has precipitated a ‘chain reaction’ effect, making it less and less
likely that Democrats will ever regain white support as the center of gravity within the
Democratic party in the South shifts toward black interests.”).
205
See, e.g., KENNY J. WHITBY, THE COLOR OF REPRESENTATION:  CONGRESSIONAL
BEHAVIOR AND BLACK INTERESTS 96-97 (1997) (linking benefits of descriptive and sub-
stantive representation); Karlan, Loss and Redemption, supra note 191, at 302-07 (noting
that “white Republican legislators are far less friendly to black interests”); cf. GUINIER,
supra note 204, at 56 (noting that black officials may share in the policy preferences of
most African Americans).
206
See Karlan, Loss and Redemption, supra note 191, at 302-07 (explaining that one
reason for “southern black voters to support the Democratic candidate is . . . because
when there is a partisan divide the Democrat will align with the party most sympathetic
to black interests”).
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white Democrats to support black candidates, at least in the general
election.207  It also typically requires black voters to comprise a major-
ity of the primary electorate, given that racial bloc voting persists
among Democrats at the primary stage.208  For Democrats, the major-
ity-minority primary is preferable to the majority-minority district as a
vehicle to elect black representatives.  It allows Democrats to preserve
and expand descriptive black representation without hindering
Democratic electoral success.
Creating a majority-minority primary, however, raises constitu-
tional concerns much like those associated with the majority-minority
district.  In a safe Democratic district where blacks comprise a minor-
ity of the population, the electorate for the Democratic primary will
be majority black only if Republican voters are denied access.  Exclud-
ing Republicans from voting in such a primary generally increases the
proportion of the primary electorate black voters comprise and, in
some districts, sufficiently so as to give rise to a majority-minority pri-
mary.  Considerations of race inform the creation of such a primary
and indeed may well predominate over other considerations when a
majority-minority primary is created to increase the proportion of
black voters in the primary electorate, thereby enhancing descriptive
black representation.
A majority-minority primary may accordingly be subject to chal-
lenges much like the ones brought against a variety of majority-
minority districts in Shaw v. Reno209 and its progeny, which mandate
the application of strict scrutiny to districting plans when considera-
tions of race predominate over traditional districting principles.210  A
207
See Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War With Itself?, supra note 22, at 1530 (cit-
ing evidence that some white southern Democrats regularly vote for black Democratic
candidates).
208
See, e.g., Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 478 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (noting that
“blacks and Hispanics do not vote cohesively in primary elections, where their alle-
giance is free of party affiliation”); Karlan, Retrogression of Retrogression, supra note 189,
at 26 n.42 (noting an absence of evidence showing “substantial white crossover voting
in Democratic primaries in majority-white districts where white Democrats have a
choice between white and black Democratic candidates and can attain both descriptive
and substantive representation”).
209
509 U.S. 630 (1993).
210
See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996) (plurality opinion) (subjecting
Texas district to strict scrutiny when “other, legitimate districting principles were ‘sub-
ordinated’ to race” (citation omitted)); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 905 (1996) (find-
ing constitutional violation in North Carolina redistricting “when race became the
‘dominant and controlling’ consideration” (citation omitted)); Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 910-915 (1995) (allowing Georgia plaintiff to challenge district as racially
categorizing despite the absence of a “bizarre” district shape); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at
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districting plan that “cannot be understood as anything other than an
effort to ‘segregat[e] . . . voters’ on the basis of race”211 is understood
to impose an expressive harm on district residents.  The Shaw deci-
sions fretted that unjustified racially predominant districting resem-
bles “political apartheid” and “may exacerbate the very patterns of ra-
cial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to
counteract.”212
Development and application of the Shaw doctrine occupied an
immense amount of the Court’s time during the 1990s.  However, the
deluge of Shaw challenges expected after the post-2000 round of re-
districting has not materialized.213  The reason stems largely from the
last of the Court’s Shaw decisions.  Easley v. Cromartie214 declined to ap-
ply to strict scrutiny to an oddly shaped district in which African
Americans comprised 47% of the district’s population.215  After review-
ing the record’s most minute details, the Court concluded that parti-
sanship best explained the district lines, and therefore that race had
not predominated in the districting process.216  Commentators reacted
to Cromartie with skepticism,217 with some predicting that the Court’s
657 (“[R]ace-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scru-
tiny.”).
211
See Bush, 517 U.S. at 1053 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (accepting the charac-
terization of the Shaw injury as expressive); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 646-47 (“In some
exceptional cases, a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular that, on its face,
it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to ‘segregat[e] . . .
voters” on the basis of race.” (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341
(1960))); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,”
and Voting Rights:  Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 483, 506-16 (1993) (describing the Shaw injury as an expressive one).
212
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 647-48.  As a descriptive matter, the Court’s fear may
be misplaced, at least as applied to many of the majority-minority districts drawn dur-
ing the 1990s.  Said to comprise some of the most integrated political communities in
the United States, see, for example, Bernstein, supra note 191, at 60, these majority-
black districts have repeatedly elected candidates supported by cross-racial coalitions in
competitive elections in which minority-preferred candidates aggressively courted
nonminority voters.  See, e.g., DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING AND REPRE-
SENTATION 19 (1999).
213
See Issacharoff, Gerrymandering, supra note 2, at 638 (arguing that Shaw created
“perverse incentives . . .  that encourage the racialization of all claims of improper ma-
nipulation of the redistricting process”).
214
532 U.S. 234 (2001).
215
Id. at 240, 258.
216
See id. at 243, 244 (acknowledging that in North Carolina “racial identification
is highly correlated with political affiliation” while rejecting the argument that race
rather than party politics explained the districting plan).
217
See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Confounded by Cromartie:  Are Racial Stereotypes Now Ac-
ceptable Accross the Board or Only When Used in Support of Partisan Gerrymanders?, 56 U.
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fact-intensive approach would invite more litigation.218  The tight con-
nection between race and political affiliation, however, has enabled
informed districters to immunize most districting plans from Shaw
challenges.
Similarly, the associational interest underlying decisions like Jones
supports the creation of a majority-black electorate without generating
the exacting review applied in the Shaw cases.  The associational in-
terest a party may assert as the justification for closing a primary is fa-
cially race neutral.  Jones, along with LaFollette and Tashjian before it,
celebrated the right to free political association as “necessarily presup-
pos[ing] the freedom to identify the people who constitute the associa-
tion, and to limit the association to those people only.”219  Jones stopped
short of invalidating the open primary as an interference with this
right,220 but nevertheless provides support for parties to demand primary
closure as a necessary component of the right to free political associa-
tion.221  Race-based considerations may still inform the decision to close
MIAMI L. REV. 489, 496 (2002) (lambasting the Court’s “predominant purpose” test as
“indeterminate to the point of incoherence”); Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategies in Consti-
tutional Law:  Lessons for Getting the Least Dangerous Branch Out of the Political Thicket, 82
B.U. L. REV. 667, 677 (2002) [hereinafter Karlan, Exit Strategies] (“[Cromartie] cannot
be explained in any sort of principled terms that provide guidance for future cases.”).
218
See, e.g., Issacharoff, Gerrymandering, supra note 2, at 640 (describing disentan-
glement of race from politics as a motivating factor as “inherently problematic, be-
cause a racially motivated legislature and one concerned only with politics could easily
produce identical results”); Karlan, Exit Strategies, supra note 217, at 684 (noting that
Cromartie offers little “guidance to future plan drawers,” and that the decision, “with its
aggressive review of the record . . . suggests the Court is committed to remaining en-
gaged in adjudicating Shaw claims.”).
219
Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107,
122 (1981).
220
See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 577 n.8 (2000) (“[T]he blan-
ket primary also may be constitutionally distinct from the open primary . . . in which
the voter is limited to one party’s ballot. . . . This case does not require us to determine
the constitutionality of open primaries.”).
221
See, e.g., Osburn v. Cox, 369 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (11th Cir. 2004) (dismissing, for
lack of standing and failure to state a claim, challenge to open primary based on Jones);
Beaver v. Clingman, 363 F.3d 1048, 1061 (10th Cir.) (holding that state interests do
not justify burden imposed on associational freedom by Oklahoma’s semi-closed pri-
mary system), cert. granted, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 5007 (Sept. 28, 2004); Ariz. Libertarian
Party, Inc. v. Bayless, 351 F.3d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (remanding for
district court evaluation as to whether Arizona might require the Libertarian Party “to
allow nonmembers to select party candidates”); see also Garrett, Is the Party Over?, supra
note 11, at 126-27 (noting that Jones did not resolve whether a state mandated open
primary was valid, but that aspects of the decision call it into question); Richard L. Ha-
sen, Do the Parties or the People Own the Electoral Process?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 815, 830 n.60
(2001) (noting that “[t]he logic of Jones . . . implies that a state may not” foist “an open
primary on a political party without its consent”); Issacharoff, Private Parties, supra note
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the primary, but the strength of the associational interest identified in
Jones suggests that such considerations need not predominate over non-
racial factors.  Closing the primary may leave minority voters as the ma-
jority or even the supermajority of the primary’s electorate.  So long as
the party claims an associational interest in closure, however, race
should not be the predominant reason for creating a majority-minority
primary.
The result is that voters participating in such a majority-minority
primary need not sustain the injury the Court understands unconstitu-
tional racial gerrymandering to produce.  The Court’s concern about
balkanization and polarization in Shaw and its progeny does not nec-
essarily transfer to a closed majority-minority primary in a safe district.
To be sure, the Shaw cases are concerned about how district bounda-
ries shape political participation, a concern that seemingly focuses on
the effects districting decisions produce as opposed to the motivations
that lay behind them.  Doctrinally, however, the Shaw cases render
suspect only those districting decisions (and, by extension, choices of
primary systems) propelled predominantly by race.  The districting
process may produce an oddly shaped district that suggests a particu-
lar intent dictated its contours.222  Ultimately, however, the expressive
injury identified in Shaw stems, as a matter of law, from the intent of
those creating the plan, not the results the plan produces.223
The right to free political association provides an impetus for
primary closure that prevents race from being the predominant mo-
tive for the action.  The racially predominant intent propelling con-
cerns about “political apartheid” in the majority-minority districts is
thus absent.  Despite the similarities between the primary’s electorate
and those in the Shaw districts, voters should not suffer an expressive
injury.
6, at 284 (arguing that the Court’s analysis in Jones cannot “sustain the distinction as
between the various primary systems”).
222
See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (striking down a re-
districting plan that changed a district from a square “into a strangely irregular twenty-
eight-sided figure” for the implied purpose of redistributing black voters).
223
See, e.g., Issacharoff, Gerrymandering, supra note 2, at 636-37 (noting that Shaw’s
progeny now mandate a “robust evidentiary hunt for any trace of controlling racial
considerations in the drawing of legislative boundaries” and that “the Court has now
come to believe that the appearances that matter are no longer the district lines but
the formalities of the legislative record”).
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B. The Majority-Minority Primary, Racial Vote Dilution, and Partisan
Gerrymandering
Last spring, the Court refused to impose meaningful limits on par-
tisan gerrymandering.  Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Vieth v. Jube-
lirer224 maintained that partisan gerrymander claims are nonjusticiable
because no discernible and manageable standard against which to
measure them exists.225  Justice Kennedy thought a manageable standard
might ultimately be discerned, and thus refused to hold these claims
nonjusticiable.226  He was, however, unable to articulate such a standard,
and the dissenters disagreed among themselves as to how such claims
might be adjudicated.227
The consequence is that Vieth preserved the status quo.  Even assum-
ing justiciability, challenges to partisan gerrymanders remain doomed to
fail, at least in federal court.  And, as before, losers in the redistricting
process will continue to recast partisan defeats as legal injuries under
case law pertaining to one person, one vote;228 racial gerrymandering;229
224
124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004).
225
While the question whether claims of partisan gerrymandering should be justici-
able lies outside the scope of this Article, the Court’s refusal to give bite to such claims
is reason enough for the justices to rethink their narrowing of Smith and Terry.  See text
following note 301.
226
See Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1795 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“That no such standard
has emerged in this case should not be taken to prove that none will emerge in the fu-
ture.”).
227
See id. at 1812 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I would apply the standard set forth in
the Shaw cases and ask whether the legislature allowed partisan considerations to
dominate and control the lines drawn, foresaking all neutral principles.”); id. at 1817
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“I would adopt a political gerrymandering test analogous to
the summary judgment standard [in employment discrimination law].”); id. at 1827-29
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (providing examples of “strong indicia of abuse” in partisan
gerrymandering that would violate the Equal Protection Clause).
228
See, e.g., Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1326, 1352 (N.D. Ga.) (per cu-
riam) (holding that a state legislative apportionment plan which deviated from popu-
lation equality by 9.98% violated the one person, one vote principle), aff’d, 124 S. Ct.
2806 (2004).
229
See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Challenges to Racial Redis-
tricting in the New Millenium:  Hunt v. Cromartie as a Case Study, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
227, 309 (2001) (arguing that racial gerrymandering cases “are about politics” and not
race); Issacharoff, Gerrymandering, supra note 2, at 638 (“[P]artisan battles for the spoils
of redistricting were successfully recast as racial gerrymandering claims [following
Shaw].”); Megan Creek Frient, Note, Similar Harm Means Similar Claims:  Doing Away
with Davis v. Bandemer’s Discriminatory Effect Requirement in Political Gerrymandering Cases,
48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 617, 655 (1998) (“Because . . . a political gerrymander cannot
be invalidated unless plaintiffs allege the scheme is a racial gerrymander, parties both
bringing and defending these claims have incentives to attempt to emphasize or
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and racial vote dilution.230  The associational interest underlying deci-
sions like Jones offers another claim for redistricting losers, and specifi-
cally, for Democrats to exploit.
Republicans unsurprisingly do not share the Democrats’ desire to
disperse African American voters, and thus seek to concentrate the
maximum number of these voters within as few districts as lawfully
possible.231  Ashcroft permits Republicans to do so, just as it permits
Democrats to unpack majority-minority districts.232  
Jones enables Democrats to counter this effort when they lack con-
trol of the districting process.  Jones also allows Democrats to demand
the closure of the Democratic primary in Republican-created majority-
minority districts and thereby force the further concentration of black
voters in the primary electorate.  Such action may seem contrary to
Democratic interests, given the party’s desire to disperse African
American voting strength.  Yet closing the Democratic primary in
these circumstances may prompt precisely this result, when, as ex-
plained below, closure sufficiently increases the proportion of black
voters in the primary electorate to give rise to racial vote dilution.
1. Racial Vote Dilution and the Partisan Primary
Thirty years ago, the Supreme Court recognized that inadequate
access to primary elections may contribute to racial vote dilution in an
electoral district.  White v. Regester233 affirmed the existence of such di-
lution based, in part, on the finding that a white-dominated organiza-
tion had “effective control of Democratic Party candidate slating” and
that the local “black community has been effectively excluded from
downplay the degree to which considerations of race and political affiliation played a
role in enacting a reapportionment plan.”).
230
See, e.g., Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 474, 515 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (reject-
ing partisan gerrymander claim, vote dilution claim, and other challenges to “re-
redistricting” in Texas).
231
See, e.g., id. at 518 (Ward, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he
changes to [the district] were not intended to increase minority voter participation
either by strengthening the district or ‘unpacking’ the minority voters into adjoining
districts to maximize the overall political strength of Hispanics.  These changes were
designed to crush these minority voters’ participation in the political process.”); Saun-
ders, supra note 192, at 193 (surmising that Republicans will challenge “unpacking” as
a VRA violation).
232
See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 2513 (2003) (noting that states retain
substantial discretion to select which among various electoral structures they think best
protects minority voting strength); see also Karlan, Retrogression of Retrogression, supra
note 189, at 30-31 (discussing the novelty of Ashcroft’s holding).
233
412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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participation in the Democratic primary selection process.”234  Yet a
racially inclusive primary does not itself ensure that a minority com-
munity can aggregate its voters effectively.  District boundaries influ-
ence minority voting strength in the general election even if access to
the ballot box is guaranteed.235  So too, primaries in a safe district may
be structured in a manner that denies minority voters an equal oppor-
tunity to participate in the electoral process and thereby dilutes their
vote.
The paradigmatic example of racial vote dilution occurs when a
jurisdiction employs an at-large system governing the election of rep-
resentatives to a multimember governing body.236  A politically cohe-
sive racial minority group with a distinct socioeconomic profile, his-
torically African Americans, comprises a percentage of the population
sufficiently large that it could elect a representative of its choice if
candidates for the governing body ran from geographically based dis-
tricts.  Persistent white bloc voting, however, means that black-preferred can-
didates have not prevailed in the at-large system and are unlikely to do
234
Id. at 766 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Zimmer v. McKeithan,
485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (listing “a lack of access to the process of slating
candidates” to be among the “panoply of factors” that inform the inquiry into racial
vote dilution), aff’d sub nom. E. Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976)
(per curiam); S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,
206-07 (listing, among factors shaping dilution inquiry under 1982 amendments to
section 2 of the VRA, the extent to which “[i]f there is a candidate slating process, . . .
the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process”).
235
See, e.g., Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 640 F. Supp. 1347, 1356-59 (M.D. Ala.
1986) (discussing the systemic diminution of black political power in Alabama); see also
Lani Guinier, No Two Seats:  The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413,
1424, 1481-82 (1991) (distinguishing “first generation” voting rights, those revolving
around basic suffrage, from “second generation” voting rights, those involving the
freedom from representative dilution, and identifying the existence of a “third genera-
tion” of voting rights, those dealing with the evils of tokenism); Pamela S. Karlan, The
Rights to Vote:  Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1709-20 (1993) (de-
lineating a “continuum” of voting rights of three types:  “participatory,” “aggregative,”
and “governance”).
236
See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47-48 (1986) (“This Court has long
recognized that multimember districts and at-large voting schemes may operate to
minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial [minorities in] the voting popula-
tion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982)
(holding that a county’s at-large system of elections unconstitutionally diluted the vot-
ing power of its black citizens), cited in Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48; Goosby v. Town Bd., 180
F.3d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming district court’s decision to abolish at-large elec-
tion and replace it with six single-member districts to remedy minority vote dilution).
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so.237  In this circumstance, the at-large regime dilutes African Ameri-
can voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the VRA.238
In a safe district marked by racial bloc voting, an open primary
may function like a dilutive at-large electoral system, submerging the
votes of a cohesive racial minority.239  If party affiliation strongly corre-
lates with race, nonmember participation in a determinative party
primary can flood the primary electorate and thereby diminish or
eliminate entirely the opportunity for meaningful political participa-
tion by members of the minority racial group.  The absence of compe-
tition in the general election denies minority voters a venue for politi-
cal participation that might offset the lack of opportunity to influence
the primary.
A closed primary in a safe district may also give rise to racial vote
dilution, albeit of a different sort.  District boundaries typically dilute
minority voting strength by placing members of a geographically co-
hesive minority community in two or more districts, thereby “fractur-
ing” the community and replicating the dilution caused by the at-large
regime.  A districting plan, however, may also be dilutive by “packing”
an excessive number of minority voters into a single district, even
237
See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51 (requiring that, to prove that a districting plan di-
lutes the vote of a racial minority, plaintiffs must show that a minority group “is suffi-
ciently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district,” that the group is “politically cohesive,” and that the “white majority votes suf-
ficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate”
(citations omitted); see also Goosby, 180 F.3d at 494 (discussing aspects of at-large elec-
tions in large districts that disproportionately impair the ability of black candidates to
campaign effectively).
238
See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a-1973b (1994)) (prohibiting any voting “standard, prac-
tice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or abridgement of the right . . . to vote on
account of race or color” and defining a statutory violation to occur “if, based on the
totality of circumstances . . . the political processes leading to the nomination or elec-
tion . . . are not equally open” to members of a protected class, such that these mem-
bers “have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice”).  The vast majority of le-
gal challenges brought under amended Section 2 have addressed the form or configu-
ration of an electoral districting plan.  See, e.g., Whitfield v. Democratic Party of Ark.,
890 F.2d 1423, 1427 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that “challeng[es] [to] at-large election
schemes and districting matters . . . [comprise] most of the previous section 2 cases”),
on reh’g, 902 F.2d 15 (1990).
239
See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 22, at 770 (“[P]roof of racial bloc voting [is]
the touchstone of a section 2 claim of dilution through submergence.”).
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though the minority population is sufficiently large to exert meaning-
ful influence in more than one district.240
Packing has long been a form of racial vote dilution in the district-
ing context.  The practice predates the Voting Rights Act, and was a
particularly effective dilutive device in the years before the Court ar-
ticulated the one person, one vote principle.  State officials could
minimize black voting strength by placing a large black community
within one voting district while spreading an equal number of white
voters among several more sparsely populated districts.  Notorious ex-
amples during the late nineteenth century include North Carolina’s
“Black Second,” Mississippi’s “shoestring district,” Alabama’s Fourth,
and South Carolina’s “boa constrictor” Seventh District.241
These packed districts “wasted” black votes by minimizing the in-
fluence of African American voters in other districts.  They also func-
tioned to deny black and white voters alike the opportunity to engage
in meaningful cross-racial dialog within a district and to form alliances
when their interests coincided.242  The district lines that separated
black and white voters severed the most natural means for voters to
interact and find common ground, while the disproportionately low
population among white districts meant white voters controlled the
240
See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S.Ct. 2498, 2506 (2003) (discussing “pack-
ing”); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153-54 (1993) (describing how “packing” di-
lutes minority votes); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46 n.11 (stating that the minority vote be-
comes less effective if states concentrate minority voters “into districts where they
constitute an excessive majority”); W. Mark Crain, The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious
Redistricting:  An Empirical Analysis, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 193, 209-210 (2001) (inferring
from statistical evidence that creating majority-minority districts makes minority voters
less influential); Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1713 (2001) (arguing that packing harms a minority group by
“robbing the group of an opportunity to influence electoral outcomes in other dis-
tricts”).
241
See, e.g., ERIC ANDERSON, RACE AND POLITICS IN NORTH CAROLINA 1872-1901:
THE BLACK SECOND (1981); J. Morgan Kousser, How to Determine Intent:  Lessons from
L.A., 7 J.L. & POL. 591, 598-606 (1991) (discussing racial gerrymandering in Alabama,
Mississippi, and South Carolina during the 1870s and 1880s); J. Morgan Kousser, Shaw
v. Reno and the Real World of Redistricting and Representation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 625, 670
(1995) [hereinafter Kousser, Real World] (noting that between 1872 and 1900, North
Carolina’s Second District was “packed” with a substantial black majority and dispro-
portionately high overall population that “effectively confined black control in a state
that was approximately a third African-American to a maximum of one district in eight
or nine . . . and minimized black influence and Republican representation in all the
other congressional districts”).
242
See, e.g., GUINIER, supra note 204, at 135 (arguing that racially homogenous dis-
tricts decrease opportunities for cross-racial appeals among voters and among the leg-
islators elected from such districts).
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electoral process, even in states with sizable black populations.243  In
this sense, the packed district and the white primary were part and
parcel of the same program.  They kept white voters in control of the
electoral process by preventing white and black voters from “making
common cause.”244  
In a safe district, the majority’s party primary may function like a
packed district.  If the primary is open, its electorate should mirror
that of the district as a whole.  Insofar as minority voters represent a
disproportionate share of the district population, they will similarly
pack the primary.  If the primary is closed, its electorate may also be
packed with minority voters, even if the district itself has a racial com-
position that would not be characterized as packed.  Given African
American affiliation with the Democratic Party, closing the Demo-
cratic primary in a safe Democratic district may increase the propor-
tion of black voters in the primary electorate so extensively as to ren-
der the primary packed and thereby give rise to racial vote dilution.
As with the open primary, the dilutive device here is not the
closed primary operating alone, but instead the operation of that
primary structure within a safe district.  A competitive general election
permits a closed primary to function without contributing to racial
vote dilution.  The packing that results from closure occurs only be-
cause the primary constitutes the sole opportunity for electoral deci-
sion making in the district.  If the general election is competitive, the
minority votes otherwise “wasted” by packing in the primary become
essential for minority influence in the general election.  And for white
and black voters alike, competition at the general election offers the
opportunity for cross-racial dialogue sacrificed by packing at the pri-
mary stage.  Absent competition, however, the primary structure gives
rise to racial vote dilution.
2. The Majority-Minority Primary as a Redistricting Tool
Racial vote dilution is typically remedied by redistricting.  For ex-
ample, a districting plan comprised of single-member districts may
remedy the dilution caused by an at-large voting regime.245  Each dis-
243
See, e.g., Kousser, Real World, supra note 241, at 670 (discussing late nineteenth
century North Carolina).
244
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 11, at 663.
245
See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982) (stating that, where minor-
ity-preferred candidates consistently fail to be elected in multimember districts, they
may be successful in single-member districts); Goosby v. Town Bd., 180 F.3d 476, 481
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trict contains fewer overall voters than did the at-large system, and,
when the districts are properly drawn, minority voters in some districts
will comprise a greater proportion of the district’s electorate than they
did in the electorate of the at-large regime.  This increase provides
minority voters a greater opportunity to participate and elect repre-
sentatives of their choice.
In a safe district, a closed primary may similarly remedy the dilu-
tion evident when an open primary is used.  Where minority voters
substantially share a single party affiliation, closing that party’s pri-
mary reduces the overall number of voters participating in that proc-
ess, and thereby increases the relative influence of minority voters.
California Democratic Party v. Jones246 insisted that meaningful politi-
cal participation does not require nonmember access to a determina-
tive primary,247 and thereby made clear that a majority party in a safe
district may close its primary without interfering with the right to
vote.248  Jones, however, did more than give its stamp of approval to an
electoral practice of longstanding use.  Its broader import lies in the
power its reconceptualization of political participation lodges in a po-
litical party, and the Democratic Party in particular.  Where an open
primary reveals racial vote dilution, closure at the party’s request not
only promotes the party’s interest in free association, but may also in-
crease the proportion of minority voters in the primary electorate to
sufficiently cure the dilution.  A closed Democratic primary is most
likely to yield this result.249  Accordingly, the Democratic Party may
forestall redistricting that otherwise would be necessary to address ra-
cial vote dilution by asserting an associational interest in closing its
primary.
A Democratic district, however, may already contain a sizeable
minority population, particularly when the districting process lies
(2d Cir. 1999) (affirming a district court’s minority vote dilution remedy of substiting
six single-member election districts for an at-large district).
246
530 U.S. 567 (2000).
247
See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s state-
ment in Jones that exclusion from determinative party primaries does not constitute
disenfranchisement).
248
See Hasen, supra note 221, at 816 (“[Jones] giv[es] the parties the last word on
the form of political primaries used to pick party nominees to run in the general elec-
tion.”).
249
See supra note 189 and accompanying text (discussing African American voters’
loyalty to the Democratic Party).
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within Republican control.250  Here, closing the Democratic primary
may not simply result in a majority-minority primary, but in a packed
primary, and hence one that gives rise to racial vote dilution instead of
curing it.251  In this context, too, Jones cedes to the party power to con-
trol the racial composition of its primary electorate.  The conflict be-
tween the party’s constitutional right to free association and the fed-
eral statutory right of minority voters to be protected from racial vote
dilution need not be inexorable.  Resolution lies in a new redistricting
effort, one that sufficiently disperses minority voters among neighbor-
ing districts so that primary closure no longer yields a packed elector-
ate.  Put differently, the Democratic Party can force a new redistricting
effort by asserting its associational interest in a closed primary, thereby
obtaining a districting plan that better advances its partisan goals.
Jones accordingly provides an additional phase to the partisan re-
districting process.  It offers the opportunity to destabilize the prevail-
ing plan, albeit not by direct challenge, but instead by articulating an
independent interest, the assertion of which renders the adopted plan
defective.  It enables the Democratic Party effectively to “unpack” dis-
tricts in which a Republican-controlled legislature has concentrated
minority voters.
C.  Cynthia McKinney and Georgia’s Open Primary
A recent case from Georgia helps make this discussion more con-
crete, albeit largely by counterexample.  On August 20, 2002, five-term
U.S. Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney lost the Democratic primary
in Georgia’s Fourth Congressional District to former state court judge
Denise Majette.  According to McKinney’s supporters, McKinney re-
ceived the majority of the Democratic votes cast, but Majette allegedly
won because approximately 37,500 Republicans voted against McKin-
ney in the district’s Democratic primary.252  Under Georgia law, a voter
250
See supra notes 191-92, 231 and accompanying text (recognizing Republican
incentive to preserve majority-minority districts).
251
See supra notes 240-44 and accompanying text (analyzing packing).
252
Ben Smith & David A. Milliron, Vote Analysis:  GOP Not Key in McKinney Loss,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 15, 2002, at A1 (reporting allegations of crossover voting but
disputing their significance); see Thomas B. Edsall, Impact of McKinney Loss Worries Some
Democrats, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2002, at A4 [hereinafter Edsall, Impact of McKinney
Loss] (reporting that Majette defeated McKinney “58 percent to 42 percent” in a
Democratic primary dominated by Jewish-Muslim tension, with “many” Republicans
voting).  The history of the disputed primary is also briefly summarized in Osburn v.
Cox, 369 F.3d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 2004).
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may participate in a party primary regardless of party affiliation.253
McKinney’s supporters responded to her defeat by filing suit in fed-
eral court.  The complaint in Osburn v. Cox254 claimed that “malicious”
crossover voting by Republicans in the August Democratic primary
combined with bloc voting by white Democrats to dilute the District’s
cohesive black vote.255  While both McKinney and Majette are African
American, the Osburn plaintiffs insisted that black voters overwhelm-
ingly favored McKinney, and that white bloc voting in the primary
prevented her nomination and ultimate election.256  Because Demo-
crats comprise nearly 70% of the voters in the Fourth District, the
Democratic nominee wins the general election.257
The Osburn complaint was inartfully presented and rightly dis-
missed.258  Nevertheless, the allegation that Georgia’s open primary
253
Voters in Georgia do not identify a political party affiliation when they register
to vote and may vote in any particular partisan primary.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-
224(d) (2003) (allowing electors “to vote in any primary or election”).  Once a voter
participates in a party’s primary during a particular election cycle, that voter may not
then vote in another party’s primary during the same cycle.  Id.
254
No. 1:02-CV-2721-CAP (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2003), aff’d, 393 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir.
2004).
255
See Complaint at 1-12, Osburn v. Cox, No. 1:02-CV-2721-CAP (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1,
2003), filed Oct. 4, 2002.  The complaint also alleged that the crossover Republican
vote constituted forced political association that violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Democratic Party.  Id. at 9.
A subsequent study sponsored by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution took issue with
these allegations.  Since voters in Georgia do not register to vote based on party affilia-
tion, the study traced back to 1990 the voting histories of DeKalb County voters who
participated in the August 20th primary.  The newspaper concluded that no more than
3,118 of the 68,612 votes Majette received could be clearly identified as having been
cast by Republican voters.  The vast majority of the voters who participated in the pri-
mary had voted too infrequently, or switched parties so often that the newspaper con-
cluded they could not be fairly characterized as Democrats or Republicans.  Smith &
Milliron, supra note 252, at A1.  The Osburn plaintiffs rejected these findings as flawed.
See id. (quoting the attorney for the Osburn plaintiffs as saying he did not give credence
to the newspaper’s research).
256
See Complaint at 4, Osburn v. Cox, No. 1:02-CV-2721-CAP (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1,
2003) (alleging that McKinney won all but one precinct in majority-black South
DeKalb County, and received seventy-five percent of the vote in that region).
257
See, e.g., Georgia Election Results, at http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/
election-results/default.htm (last visited Sep. 6, 2004) (providing links to statistics
demonstrating that Democrats have won the congressional election in the Fourth Dis-
trict since it was redrawn in 1995); see also William Douglas, Mideast Issue Infuses Georgia
Race, NEWSDAY, Aug. 18, 2002, at A8.
258
See Osburn v. Cox, 369 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal for
lack of standing and failure to state a claim for a violation of the Fourteenth or Fif-
teenth Amendments, or section 2 of the VRA); see also infra note 262 and accompany-
ing text (discussing racial bloc voting allegation).
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gave rise to racial vote dilution was hardly trivial.  At bottom, the Os-
burn plaintiffs were claiming that voting among white and black
Democrats in the Fourth Congressional District was racially polarized
when party affiliation was not at issue.  That is, white and black Demo-
crats favored different candidates in the primary even though they
consistently supported the Democratic nominee in the general elec-
tion.259  The plaintiffs alleged that the Democratic primary electorate
would have been safely majority-minority had nonmembers been ex-
cluded, and would have nominated the candidate most preferred by
the cohesive black community.260
According to the plaintiffs, the open primary enabled white
Democrats to join forces with white Republicans to defeat the black-
preferred candidate.  The dilution claim accordingly posited that the
open primary operated in Georgia’s Fourth District much like an at-
large electoral system, diluting the influence a minority community
could otherwise exert in districted elections.  Like an at-large system,
the open primary flooded the primary electorate with white voters and
thereby blocked the cohesive black community from electing its rep-
resentative of choice.261
Or so they alleged:  while cogent in principle, the Osburn plain-
tiffs’ claim ran afoul of the facts.  Most significantly, voting in the
Fourth District was not racially polarized to the degree the plaintiffs
alleged.  To be sure, the district that first enabled Cynthia McKinney
to become Georgia’s first African American congresswoman was 64%
black.262  Back in 1992, the Eleventh District was one of three majority
African American districts the Georgia legislature had drawn after the
1990 Census.263  It consisted of portions of several counties, extending
259
See generally Edsall, Impact of McKinney Loss, supra note 252, at A4 (“Majette is
strongly favored to win the Nov. 5 general election in the solidly Democratic dis-
trict . . . .”); Edsall, Questions Raised About Donors to Georgia Lawmaker’s Campaign, WASH.
POST, Aug. 13, 2002, at A2 [hereinafter Edsall, Questions Raised] (stating that the victor
in the Democratic primary “is almost certain to win the general election”).
260
As redrawn following the 2000 census, the Fourth District was only nominally a
majority-minority district, with black voters comprising 50.02% of the voting age popu-
lation.  Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 44 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated by 123 S. Ct.
2498 (2003).
261
See supra note 239 and accompanying text (discussing vote dilution in at-large
and open primary systems).
262
See Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1366 n.12 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (listing the
Eleventh District as having a sixty-four percent black population and a sixty percent
black voting age population), aff’d, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
263
Id.
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from the rural center of the state to more urban communities in
Augusta, Savannah, and southern DeKalb County.264
After the Supreme Court struck down that district as an unconsti-
tutional racial gerrymander,265 McKinney ran for office in 1996 from
the Fourth District.  She won with fifty-eight percent of the vote, even
though blacks represented only thirty-three percent of the District’s
voting-age population.266  The Fourth District returned McKinney to
Congress in 1998 and again in 2000.267  She emerged on the national
stage as one of several African American representatives originally
elected from majority-black districts, but who subsequently garnered
support among white residents in newly drawn white-majority dis-
tricts.268
264
See Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1367 (describing the geographical reach of the dis-
trict).
265
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922-28 (1995).  McKinney’s Eleventh District
was reconfigured.  See Johnson v. Miller, 922 F. Supp. 1556, 1561-69 (S.D. Ga. 1995)
(describing a court-drawn plan that was not subject to preclearance under section 5 of
the VRA), aff’d sub nom. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997) (upholding the legality
of the new districting plan).  For discussions of the Abrams litigation, see Pamela S. Kar-
lan, The Fire Next Time:  Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L. REV. 731, 745-
53 (1998); Thalia L. Downing Carroll, Casenote, One Step Forward or Two Steps Back?
Abrams v. Johnson and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 917, 917-26,
939-51 (1998); Lindsay Ryan Errickson, Note, Threading the Needle:  Resolving the Impasse
Between Equal Protection and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2057, 2064-
65 (2001).
266
See Kevin Sack, Victory of 5 Redistricted Blacks Recasts Gerrymandering Dispute, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter Sack, Victory of 5] (noting McKinney’s success in
the new district).
267
See Georgia Election Results, at http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/results/
default.htm (last visited Sep. 6, 2004) (providing links to election results that show that
in 1998 and 2000, McKinney won 61.1% and 60.7% of the vote, respectively); see also
Samuel Issacharoff, Why Elections?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 684, 692 n.52 (2002) (discussing
McKinney’s success).
268
See Kevin Sack, In the Rural White South, Seeds of a Biracial Politics, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 30, 1998, at A1 [hereinafter Sack, Rural White South] (identifying McKinney as one
of nine black representatives elected to Congress in 1998 from white-majority districts).
After the 2000 census, the Georgia General Assembly produced new districting plans
for the state’s congressional delegation and for the State House and Senate.  The
Fourth Congressional District emerged with an increased percentage of African
American residents, and with an increase in the district’s black voting age population.
African Americans thereafter comprised 54.69% of McKinney’s district and 50.02% of
its voting age population.  See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 24, 44 (D.D.C. 2002)
(citing voter statistics in the Fourth District), vacated by 123 S. Ct. 2498 (2003).  The
federal district court in Washington, D.C. precleared Georgia’s congressional plan in
April 2002.  195 F. Supp. 2d at 97.  Georgia challenged the court’s refusal to preclear
the Georgia Senate plan before the Supreme Court.  123 S. Ct. 2498, 2517 (2003).
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McKinney, however, alienated many of her supporters—white and
black alike—by making a series of controversial statements following
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  In a radio interview, she
suggested that the Bush administration knew in advance that the at-
tacks were coming and that “persons close to this administration
[were] poised to make huge profits off America’s new war.”269  After
New York City’s then–mayor, Rudy Giuliani, declined a $10 million
donation from a Saudi prince critical of U.S. Middle East policy,
McKinney wrote the prince directly and suggested a range of Georgia-
based projects that could use the money.270  Subsequently, after Ma-
jette accused McKinney of accepting campaign contributions from
Arab Americans linked to terrorism,  McKinney responded that she
would not “racially profile” campaign contributors.271
The McKinney-Majette primary battle became national news.
Both candidates obtained support from outside the district.  The Yale-
educated Majette courted and raised $1.1 million from a host of Jew-
ish and Republican groups, while several Muslim associations lent
their support to McKinney.272  Republican leaders and conservative
commentators encouraged Republican voters to vote for Majette in
the open Democratic primary.273  Prominent black leaders, including
269
See Barr, McKinney Lose in Georgia Primaries, CNN, Aug. 21, 2002, at www.CNN.com/
2002/allpolitics/08/21/elec02.ga.primary.results/index.html (quoting the September
11th remark); see also Lynette Clemetson, For Black Politicians, 2 Races Suggest a Rise of
New Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2002, at A1 (reporting on the controversy and quot-
ing a McKinney supporter as saying that McKinney’s September 11th comments made
voters “a little apprehensive”); Editorial, McKinney’s Call For Probe Is Nutty, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Apr. 15, 2002, at A9 (criticizing McKinney for her comment); Smith & Milli-
ron, supra note 252, at A1 (paraphrasing the remark).
270
See Barr, McKinney Lose in Georgia Primaries, supra note 269 (relating McKinney’s
attempt to attract funds from a Saudi prince).
271
For news accounts of the campaign controversy, see id.; Clemetson, supra note
269; Edsall, Questions Raised, supra note 259, at A2.  See also Jake Tapper, Keeping the New
Black Candidate Down, SALON.COM, June 18, 2002, at http://archive.salon.com/
politics/feature/2002/06/18/davis/index_np.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2004) (report-
ing that McKinney’s “controversial approach to the Middle East conflict” included hir-
ing a press secretary with links to Hamas who publicly stated that “Israeli occupation of
all territories must end, including Congress”).
272
For news accounts of the primary as a manifestation of black-Jewish tensions,
see Clemetson, supra note 269; Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Rift Between Blacks, Jews Worries
Democrats for Fall; Strain Over Middle East Could Threaten Chances of Winning Back Congress,
BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 26, 2002, at 1A; Edsall, Impact of McKinney Loss, supra note 252;
Dahleen Glanton, Demographics, Apathy Blamed in McKinney Defeat, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22,
2002, at 8; Tapper, supra note 271; Shawn Zeller, Tough Sell, NAT’L J., Dec. 14, 2002.
273
Bill Rankin, Name McKinney Victor, Crossover Voting Suit Asks, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Oct. 5, 2002, at 2E; Jim Wooten, Republicans Can Help Boot McKinney, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Aug. 4, 2002, at H4 (arguing that Republicans in the Fourth District “don’t
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those who had supported McKinney in previous campaigns, refused to
endorse her,274 while more controversial black leaders like Al Sharpton
and Louis Farrakhan supported her candidacy.275  The campaign be-
came acrimonious as primary day approached.276  The night before
the primary, state representative Billy McKinney stated on live televi-
sion that his daughter’s campaign difficulties had been caused by the
“J-E-W-S,” spelling out the word.277
McKinney was defeated the next day.  The controversy she gener-
ated explains her loss better than racial bloc voting.278  While white
voters, including numerous Republicans, indisputably preferred Ma-
jette to McKinney,279 McKinney had received considerable white sup-
really have to put up with a liberal Democrat who’s also contemptuous of them” be-
cause “[w]hile they don’t matter in November, they can matter in August”).
274
Clemetson, supra note 269, at A1 (reporting that NAACP Chairman Julian
Bond and former Atlanta Mayor Maynard Jackson “distanced” themselves from
McKinney, despite having supported her in the past); Edsall, Impact of McKinney Loss,
supra note 252, at A4 (reporting that McKinney’s campaign produced a “split among
Atlanta’s most prominent blacks” and that former Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young and
baseball hero Hank Aaron refused to endorse McKinney).
275
Eli Kintisch, The Crossover Candidate, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 23, 2002 (document-
ing the McKinney defeat), available at http://www.prospect.org/web/printfriendly-
view.ww?id=6524.
276
See Rhonda Cook, McKinney Hits Opponent’s Court Record, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
July 27, 2002, at 3H (describing McKinney campaign radio ads likening Majette to an
“angry, out-of-control police officer beating up a prisoner”); Richmond Eustis, Welcome
to the Campaign Trail, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., July 29, 2002, at 1 (stating that
McKinney’s ads called Majette “a bad judge who trampled the rights of defendants”);
Tapper, supra note 271 (claiming McKinney portrayed Majette as “a tool of whitey,”
and quoting a McKinney campaign statement as saying “Denise Majette’s candidacy is a
Trojan Horse for the good old boys from the bad old days”).
277
The spelling incident is reported in Edsall, Impact of McKinney Loss, supra note
252, at A4; Steve Miller, McKinney Blames Ouster on Crossover; Angry GOP, Jewish Voters
Prove Deciding Factor in Georgia Primary, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2002, at A04; Smith &
Milliron, supra note 252, at A1.
278
See Kintisch, supra note 275 (noting that McKinney had previously “won
enough white support to give her comfortable margins” but lost in 2002 “because she
gave her opponents plenty of grist”).  McKinney herself may have recognized as much.
After Majette announced she would give up her House seat and run for the Senate,
McKinney entered and won the July 2004 Democratic primary in Georgia’s Fourth Dis-
trict.  This time, McKinney employed less contentious rhetoric and successfully ap-
pealed to suburban voters.  See Two Years Is a Short Time, THE ECONOMIST, July 24, 2004,
at 40 (reporting McKinney’s victory and noting that she ran “a much smarter cam-
paign than she had in 2002” and that “[s]he kept her head down, shunning the me-
dia”).  Growing concern about the intervening war in Iraq, moreover, made McKin-
ney’s prior comments about the Bush Administration seem less controversial.  See id.
(noting McKinney’s “success also reflects the souring of opinion about the Iraq war”).
279
See Edsall, Impact of McKinney Loss, supra note 252, at A4 (detailing McKinney’s
loss to Majette).
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port in previous elections.280  So too, African American support for
McKinney diminished as well in 2002, notwithstanding the Osburn
plaintiffs’ claim to the contrary.281  After the primary, one McKinney
supporter summed up black apprehensions about her candidacy, not-
ing that “‘[s]ome in our community . . . thought our congresswoman
was too boisterous, and they carried that thought with them to the
polls.’”282
But even if the Osburn plaintiffs could have established racial bloc
voting, they would have confronted an additional difficulty.  The rem-
edy they sought would have replaced one form of racial vote dilution
with another.  The plaintiffs sought a court order excluding non-
members from participating in the Democratic primary in the Fourth
District.  Such an order would have reduced the number of voters eli-
gible to participate in the primary while ensuring that African Ameri-
cans comprised a greater proportion of those eligible.  Based on the
Osburn plaintiffs’ allegations, excluding nonmembers from the 2002
Democratic primary in the Fourth District would have given rise to a
majority-minority primary in which African Americans comprised
more than seventy percent of the primary electorate.283  If voters were
280
See, e.g., Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War With Itself?, supra note 22, at 1532
n.41 (concluding that McKinney gained white supporters between 1992 and 1996);
Sack, Rural White South, supra note 268, at A12 (noting that McKinney won the 1998
general election from a majority-white district and with “notable white support”); Sack,
Victory of 5, supra note 266 (reporting that McKinney won the 1996 general election
with 58% of the vote even though blacks represented only 33% of her district’s voting-
age population and McKinney was not an incumbent in that district); cf. D. Stephen
Voss & David Lublin, Black Incumbents, White Districts:  An Appraisal of the 1996 Congres-
sional Elections, 29 AM. POL. RES. 141, 170 (2001) (“McKinney certainly did not win ex-
tra White support in the precincts she previously represented.”).
281
See Complaint at 4, Osburn v. Cox, No. 1:02-CV-2721-CAP (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1,
2003) (alleging that McKinney won all but one precinct in majority-black South
DeKalb county, and received seventy-five percent of the vote in that county).
282
Clemetson, supra note 269, at A16; see Edsall, Impact of McKinney Loss, supra note
252, at A4 (noting failure of the McKinney campaign to produce a high turnout
among black supporters); Tapper, supra note 271 (suggesting that Majette appealed
more to the black, middle class, suburban voters “long ignored” by McKinney).  But see
Kintisch, supra note 275 (claiming McKinney retained support among middle class
blacks).
283
Based on the Osburn plaintiffs’ allegations, closing the 2002 Democratic pri-
mary would have reduced the number of participating voters to 70,670 from 117,670
who actually cast ballots.  If true racial bloc voting existed, moreover, the 49,058 votes
McKinney received came from black Democrats, who, in a closed primary, would have
controlled the outcome with more than seventy percent of the primary vote.  Com-
plaint at 4, Osburn v. Cox, No. 1:02-CV-2721-CAP (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2003).
Moreover, the proportion of black voters eligible to participate in the 2002 Demo-
cratic primary would have been even higher had the primary been closed, given evi-
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racially polarized in the manner the Osburn plaintiffs alleged, this
primary would have nominated the black-preferred candidate, who
would have then prevailed in the general election.
Had Georgia’s Fourth Congressional District been drawn to in-
clude an electorate that was 70% black, it almost certainly would have
been deemed dilutive within the meaning of the VRA.  Racial vote di-
lution in this context would stem not from “cracking” or “fracturing” a
minority community, but instead from packing more black voters
within the district than are needed to ensure meaningful influence,
thereby preventing some of these voters from exerting influence else-
where.  Packing, as noted earlier, also skews the dialog among voters
within the district.284  To be sure, no single fixed percentage estab-
lishes that a district is “packed” with minority voters.  Twenty-five years
ago, the Court suggested that a minority population must comprise
sixty-five percent of a district’s population to enjoy a meaningful op-
portunity to participate in the electoral process.285  But by 1995, when
the Supreme Court struck down the congressional district that origi-
nally sent McKinney to Congress, it held that black residents need not
comprise sixty-four percent of the district’s population to prevent ra-
cial vote dilution.286  Today, in jurisdictions where partisan affiliation
fosters cross-racial coalitions, much smaller minority populations are
able to participate meaningfully in the electoral process.287  The Os-
burn lawsuit implied that Georgia’s Fourth Congressional District was
one such jurisdiction, with white and black Democrats joining forces
in the general election and racial bloc voting being relegated to the
primary stage.288
dence that turnout among African American voters was relatively low.  See Edsall, Im-
pact of McKinney Loss, supra note 252 (noting the failure of the McKinney campaign to
produce a high turnout among supporters).
284
See supra notes 240-44 and accompanying text (discussing packing).
285
See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 164
(1977) (finding reasonable the conclusion that “a substantial nonwhite population ma-
jority in the vicinity of sixty-five percent would be required to achieve a nonwhite ma-
jority of eligible voters”); ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 22, at 896 (“UJO v. Carey was
cited for many years in the scholarly literature as the source of the so-called ‘65%
rule.’”).
286
See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 906, 922-24 (1995) (holding that Section 5
of the VRA did not require an oddly configured district with a black population of
sixty-four percent).
287
See supra note 196 (discussing Page v. Bartels).
288
See supra notes 255-59 and accompanying text (discussing the merits of the
complaint in Osburn).
388 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 325
African American voters need not constitute seventy percent of
the primary electorate to overcome such white bloc voting.  Indeed,
even if voting in the Democratic primary is racially polarized, African
Americans need only comprise a bare majority of the primary elector-
ate to secure the nomination of their preferred candidate.  In Geor-
gia’s Fourth Congressional District, that nominee will prevail in the
general election because the District is a safe Democratic district in
which white Democrats support the Democratic nominee in the gen-
eral election.289
By contrast, making the Fourth District’s Democratic primary not
simply majority-minority, but a seventy percent black primary, skews
the primary electorate far more than is necessary for black voters to
participate and elect a representative of choice.  Voters who would be
essential for meaningful black influence in an open primary become
superfluous once the primary is closed.  As a result, excluding non-
members from the Democratic primary in the Fourth District may well
give rise to racial vote dilution through packing, just as the Fourth
District as a whole would if African Americans comprised seventy per-
cent of the district electorate.  This concentration of black voters di-
minishes the influence black voters might otherwise exert in other dis-
tricts and distorts the political dialog within the Fourth District’s
Democratic primary. 
Had Georgia’s Democratic Party asserted an associational interest
in excluding nonmembers from the Fourth District’s Democratic pri-
mary, it would have generated a conflict between its associational
freedom and the federal prohibition on racial vote dilution.  Dispers-
ing black voters through redistricting would have been necessary to
resolve this conflict.  The Democratic Party could have accordingly as-
serted its associational interest strategically to destabilize a districting
plan that failed to promote the party’s interests.290
Back in 2002, Georgia’s Democratic Party had no interest in mak-
ing this claim because it had no interest in redistricting.291  Democrats
liked the Fourth District because Democrats drew it.  As configured at
the time, the Fourth District was the product of Georgia’s post-2000
289
See supra note 257 and accompanying text (explaining Democratic dominance
in the Fourth Congressional District).
290
See supra note 251 and accompanying text (commenting on packing and its re-
lationship to a closed primary).
291
As Democratic voters, the Osburn plaintiffs asserted an associational interest in
excluding nonmembers from the Democratic party, a claim dismissed for lack of stand-
ing.  Osburn v. Cox, 369 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2004).
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redistricting process, a process controlled by Democrats.292  Not sur-
prisingly, Republicans, rather than Democrats, led the challenges to
this districting plan in Georgia v. Ashcroft.293
Like the Democratic Party, the Osburn plaintiffs had no interest in
altering district lines, but for a different reason.  Their concern was
not maximizing black or Democratic influence.  Instead, they wanted
Cynthia McKinney reelected, and understood that, at the time, only a
closed primary with an overwhelming black electorate could make
that happen.  They needed a packed primary because McKinney gen-
erated far less enthusiasm among black voters than the Osburn suit
suggested.  In fact, by August 2002, McKinney needed a primary elec-
torate that mirrored demographically the electorate that first brought
her to Congress a decade earlier.  After all, that district, with its 64%
black population, would not have selected Denise Majette over
Cynthia McKinney.294
The Supreme Court struck down that district as a racial gerry-
mander in Miller v. Johnson,295 and the Osburn plaintiffs’ attempt to
create its functional equivalent might well have been rejected on simi-
lar grounds.  The Osburn plaintiffs lacked the ostensibly race-neutral
associational interest the Democratic Party might have asserted to jus-
tify closing the primary.  Instead, race was not just the predominant
reason but the sole reason the Osburn plaintiffs cited to exclude non-
members from participating in the Fourth District’s Democratic pri-
mary.  The racial polarization the Court associates with racial gerry-
manders may not have been fully manifest in the old Eleventh
292
See Ringel, supra note 199, at 1 (noting that Democrats drew the 2001 Georgia
Senate map).
293
See, e.g., Brief for Appellees at 4, 8, Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498 (2003)
(No. 02-182) (showing that the redistricting plan was drawn by a legislature with a
Democratic majority and challenged by the Justice Department); Pildes, Is Voting-Rights
Law Now at War With Itself?, supra note 22, at 1561 (noting that minority voters chal-
lenging the plan were “represented by lawyers associated with the Republican Party”);
Ringel, supra note 199, at 1 (describing efforts by Georgia Governor George E. “Sonny”
Perdue III, a Republican, to compel the state Attorney General, Thurbert E. Baker, a
Democrat, to drop Georgia’s case defending the districting plan in the Supreme
Court); see also Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 41 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting that
“[n]o Republicans in either the [Georgia] House or Senate voted for any of [the] re-
apportionment plans” adopted for the State House, State Senate, and Congressional
delegations), vacated by 123 S. Ct. 2498 (2003).
294
See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 267, at 692 (“[W]ould Denise Majette have cho-
sen to run against the incumbent Cynthia McKinney had court intervention not al-
tered the racial and political composition of McKinney’s district?”).
295
515 U.S. 900 (1995).
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District.296  Nor was racial polarization certain to materialize had the
Osburn plaintiffs prevailed.  And yet, in seeking to close the primary in
the Fourth District, the Osburn plaintiffs sought to generate and ex-
ploit precisely such polarization to aid their candidate.
The Democratic Party could have salvaged this effort by asserting
an associational interest in support of the endeavor.  It did not do so.
The party did not share the plaintiffs’ enthusiasm for McKinney,297
but, more importantly, it was satisfied with the racial composition of
Georgia’s Fourth District.  The associational interest defined in Jones
offered the party a tool to adjust the racial balance in the primary to
maximize partisan advantage.298  Partisan control of the redistricting
process that produced Georgia’s Fourth District meant the Democrats
did not need to assert this interest to restructure it.  The party already
manipulated the racial composition of the district to maximize Demo-
cratic interests.299
CONCLUSION
Ten years ago, Professor Lowenstein suggested that disavowal of
the White Primary Cases would be of little consequence.  Deeming the
decisions doctrinally problematic, he argued that the federal VRA and
“greatly changed mores” make race-based exclusions from party pri-
maries “extremely unlikely,” and thus that renunciation of the deci-
sions “would have no tangible cost in racial discrimination.”300
A decade later, the Court has come close to implementing this
suggestion.  California Democratic Party v. Jones built on precedent cele-
brating the associational rights of political parties to identify an asso-
ciational interest and, more broadly, a conception of political partici-
pation that sacrifices the core components of the White Primary Cases.
After Jones, political parties may exclude nonmembers from party pri-
maries, even when the primary functions as the sole locus of meaning-
296
See supra notes 262-64 and accompanying text (referring to the Osburn case).
297
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 277, at A4 (quoting McKinney as stating that “it looks
like the Republicans wanted to beat me more than the Democrats wanted to keep
me”).
298
See supra note 212 and accompanying text (discussing the Democrats’ potential
to take advantage of Jones).
299
See, e.g., Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1325-31 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (per cu-
riam) (discussing the tactics used by Georgia legislators to favor the election of Demo-
crats), aff’d, 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004).
300
Lowenstein, supra note 30, at 1749.  Professor Lowenstein nevertheless con-
cluded reversal, while not “monstrous,” would be “unpleasant, even disillusioning” and
hence ill-advised.  Id.
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ful electoral decisionmaking.  So too, Jones offers a political party, and
the Democratic Party in particular, the power to manipulate the racial
composition of its primary electorate through use of the majority-
minority primary.
A century ago, the Democratic Party used similar authority to ex-
clude black voters from its primary in order to keep them from influ-
encing debate and forming biracial coalitions.  Today, the party views
black voting strength as an asset that it seeks to exploit for maximum
partisan gain.  Without doubt, the spirit propelling this endeavor dif-
fers dramatically from that which implemented the white primary.
Remarkably, however, the legal regimes that authorize both efforts are
strikingly similar, leaving one political party in charge of defining the
racial make-up of a determinative party primary.
This similarity is cause for concern, particularly in light of the
Court’s recent refusal to give bite to claims of partisan gerrymander-
ing.  Propelling last Term’s plurality opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer301 was
the belief that no discernible or workable standard existed to identify
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, even though the Justices
were unanimous in finding that excessive partisan gerrymandering
damages the democratic process.
Much of that damage might be remedied by returning to the con-
ception of individual political participation set forth in the White Pri-
mary Cases.  The right to vote in a competitive electoral process be-
longs to the individual voter, not to Democrats or Republicans as a
group or to the polity as a whole.  It therefore constitutes the type of
right the Court is comfortable enforcing.  While the question of what
constitutes a competitive election might certainly be debated, district-
ing authorities know full well which districts they draw will be safe and
which will be competitive.  Defining parameters for a competitive race
need not be a judicially unmanageable task.
Put differently, the fundamental problem with the districting plan
at issue in Vieth is not that too many Republicans win elections in
Pennsylvania.  Instead, the problem is that too many voters, Republi-
can and Democrat alike, live in districts where they have no opportu-
nity for meaningful political participation.  The combination of the
disputed districting plan and Pennsylvania’s closed primary system
means that Democrats in safe Republican districts and Republicans in
safe Democratic districts are effectively shut out of the decision-
making process.  Readjusting district boundaries so that more Demo-
301
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crats are elected will not resolve the problem:  only ensuring access to
a competitive race somewhere within this electoral process will.  That
is where we should be turning our attention.
